

TECHNICAL REPORT RL-CR-81-4

9

1

DESIGN GUIDE

BUILT-IN-TEST(BIT) and
BUILT-IN-TEST EQUIPMENT (BITE)

ARMY MISSILE SYSTEMS

FINAL REPORT

Sperry Corporation Sperry Systems Management 1112 Church Street untsville, AL 35801

FOR

Ground Equipment and Missile Structures Directorate US Army Missile Laboratory JUL 8 1981

15 April 1981



# U.S. ARMY MISSILE COMMAND

Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35809

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

SMI FORM 1021, 1 JUL 79 PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE

6

UNCLASSIFIED	1 1/1/21 11/11/11
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)	
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE	READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
TR-RL-CR-81-4 AD-A 1011	
Design Guide, Built-In-Test (BIT) and Built-In-Test Equipment (BITE) for Army Missile Systems	Final Technical Report,  SP-212-1071
7. AUTHOR(s)	8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(*)
Sperry Corporation	DAAK40-79-D-0020
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Sperry Corporation	10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK
Sperry Systems Management 1112 Church Street Huntsville, AL 35801	62303A, 1L162303A214,00
Commander ATTN: DRSMI-RPT	12. REPORT DATE //15 April 1981
Redstone Arsenal. AL 35898	117
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(If different from Controlling Office) Commander	15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
U. S. Army Missile Command ATTN: DRSMI-RLD	Unclassified
Redstone Arsenal, AL 35898	15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING
Approved for public release; distribution unlimit  17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abetract entered in Block 20, if different fro	
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identity by block number) Automatic Test Equipment Built-In-Test (BIT) Built-In-Test Equipment (BITE) Design Guide	
This report documents the first draft of a design as an aid to the project manager, beginning with development, and as a guide to the system design incorporation of built-in-test (BIT) and built-in-the weapon system. It is not the intent of this to but rather to identify those subject areas the in determining the requirement for BIT.	the conceptual phase through engineer concerned with the -test equipment (BITE) into document to detail the "how

# DESIGN GUIDE

BUILT-IN-TEST (BIT) AND BUILT-IN-TEST EQUIPMENT (BITE) FOR ARMY MISSILE SYSTEMS

Prepared By


SPERRY CORPORATION

Sperry Systems Management-Huntsville
Huntsville, Alabama 35801

Prepared For

U.S. ARMY MISSILE COMMAND ARMY MISSILE LABORATORY, DRSMI-RLD Redstone Arsenal, Alabama 35809

Contract No. DAAK40-79-D-0020 Delivery Order No. 0043



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION	<u> P</u>	AGE
1.0	INTRODUCTION	5
2.0	BIT/BITE APPLICATION TO SYSTEM MAINTENANCE	9
	2.1 Maintenance Levels	9 11 12 13 13
3.0	BIT REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS	18
,	3.1 The System Engineering Process 3.2 System Operation	18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 28 29 30
4.0	BIT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS - GENERAL	33
	<ul><li>4.1 BIT Design Check List</li></ul>	33 38
	4.2.1 Purpose	39 40 40 40 40 41
	4.3 Testability Design Requirements	46 47

# TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

SECTION			<u>P</u>	AGE
	4.7 4.8 4.9	Softwar	and Signal Fan-Outs	49 50 52
5.0	COMMUN 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5	Design Commun Perform Environ		54 54 54 56 57
		5.5.1 5.5.2 5.5.3		57 58 61
	5.6 5.7 5.8	Error (	Detection	61 62 63
		5.8.1 5.8.2 5.8.3 5.8.4 5.8.5 5.8.6	Line Drivers and Receivers	63 64 65 66 69
6.0	GUIDA	NCE AND	CONTROL SYSTEMS	70
	6.1	System	Operation	70
		6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3 6.1.4 6.1.5	Radar Tracking System Operation Laser Tracking System Operation Video Tracking System Operation	70 71 74 74 74
	6.2		ce and Control System Performance	75
		6.2.1		75
		6.2.2	Radar Tracking System Performance Requirements	75
		6.2.4		76
		6.2.5	Requirements	76 76
			reriormance keudirements	/h

# TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

SECTION																		Ī	PAGE
	6.3 6.4	Enviro BIT Co	nmenta Insider	l Requations	uire s .	eme •	nts 	•	•					•		:	•		77 77
		6.4.3 6.4.4	BIT Co Self- Fail : Prelai Post	Test Safe unch	 Test	tin	  g .	•	:			•	· ·	•	•	•	•	•	77 78 79 79 81
7.0	POWER	SYSTEM	ıs																82
	7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6	System Specia Perfor BIT Co	Object Operations Mance S Insiderations	tion idera Speci ation:	 tior fica	is iti	 ons	•	•			•				•		•	84 85
		7.6.2	Power Power Power	Conv	erte	ers													90
8.0	BASIC	BIT/BI	TE DES	IGN O	JTL!	NE													93
	8.1 8.2 8.3	BIT De	luction tectab stem D	ility	Lev	/e1	Sp	eci	fi	Сa	ti	on							94
		8.3.2	Base Fault BIT Sy Design	Code ystem	Mat Eva	ri. Ilu	x . ati	on	•										98 99
REFERENCES A	AND BIE	BLIOGRA	PHY																107
APPENDIX A	ENGINE	ERING	DESIGN	IGNAH	300k	(S													108
DISTRIBUTION	T2111																		117

# LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE		PAGE
1	Tolerance Come	. 14
2	Typical Data Receiver Block Diagram	. 59
3	Typical BIT Self-Test Inputs	. 60
4	Typical Data Transmitter Block Diagram	. 67
5	Inertial Guidance and Control System Block Diagram	. 72
6	Radar Guidance and Control System Block Diagram .	. 73
7	Typical Missile Power System Configuration	. 83
8	General System Block Diagram	. 97

# SECTION 1.0 INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 FOREWORD

This design guide has been prepared as an aid to the project manager, beginning with the conceptual phase through development, and as a guide to the system design engineer concerned with the incorporation of built-in-test (BIT) and built-in-test equipment (BITE) into the weapon system. It is not the intent of this document to detail the "how to" but rather to identify those subject areas that need to be considered in determining the requirement for BIT.

During the development of a weapon system, emphasis is usually placed on design of the basic system to meet performance requirements with support requirements given a much lower priority in both time and dollars. There is evidence that this approach may well continue as the costs of weapon systems increase and dollars become more difficult to obtain.

However, if life-cycle cost goals are to be met the support requirements must be addressed early enough to influence the testability of the design. Maintainability considerations such as performance monitoring, BIT, BITE, on-line versus off-line test, and accessibility must be addressed early in the initial program development phase.

The complexity of today's modern weapon system dictates that the means for testing be considered and identified during the system concept definition, that the use of BIT be considered as a means of meeting maintenance and operational goals, and that the testing addresses the total life-cycle costs. Both the project manager and the designer must make numerous decisions based on trade studies. These decisions effect both hardware and philosophies of operation. This guide is intended as an aid in making those decisions.

Some of the information provided in the design guide is the distillation of available information contained in NAVMATINST 3960.9, Built-In-Test (BIT) Design Guide $^1$ , and RADC-TR-78-224, A Design Guide for Built-In-Test $^2$ .

# 1.2 PURPOSE OF GUIDE

The fundamental purpose of the Built-In-Test Design Guide is to:

- o Improve weapon system performance in terms of equipment readiness and availability.
- o To improve equipment testability.

To accomplish this, the design guide will be a source of reference to all levels of project/program management, designers, and the varied engineering disciplines. As a guide it is intended to discuss options available rather than a how-to-design handbook. The user will be acquainted with areas to be considered in developing the role BIT will have within the total weapon system. The overriding purpose of this guide, therefore, is to influence the reader to ensure the early consideration of the requirement for BIT to support the Army Missile Systems.

#### 1.3 DEFINITION OF BIT/BITE

MIL-STD-1309, Definitions of Terms for Test, Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment, defines those terms normally associated with test, measurement and diagnostic equipment (TMDE). The definition of BIT and BITE as stated in the standard are as follows:

# o <u>Built-In-Test (BIT)</u>

A test approach using BITE or self test hardware or software to test all or part of the unit under test.

# o Built-In-Test Equipment (BITE)

Any device which is part of an equipment or system and is used for the express purpose of testing the equipment or system. BITE is an identifiable unit of the equipment or system.

Unless otherwise stated, the definitions contained in MIL-STD-1309 apply to this guide. Where needed or appropriate, definitions will be contained within this guide to minimize the need to refer to the referenced military standard.

#### 1.4 APPLICATION OF GUIDE

This BIT Design Guide is intended to provide guidance to the weapon system planner, the weapon system project or program manager, the system designer, the detailed equipment designer, the test engineer, the software programmer, and the test equipment designer. The user at the weapon system level would include planners, estimators, operations research analyst, and specification writers. The guide can be applied during the pre-DSARC phase and the acquisition phase as well as the detailed design phase by providing guidelines of the options available. The specific use of the guide will be at the direction of the program manager. The guide is organized to provide the more general information in Sections 2.0 through 4.0 and the Army Missile System details in Sections 5.0 through 8.0.

### 1.5 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

The following lists those documents, military standards, specifications, etc. that are applicable to BIT and BITE.

o MIL-STD-1309 - Military Standard Definitions of Terms for Test, Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment

- o MIL-STD-415 Military Standard Test Provisions for Electronic Systems and Associated Equipment, Design Criteria For
- o AR 750-1 Maintenance of Supplies and Equipment Maintenance Concepts
- o AR 70-38 RDT&E of Materiel for Extreme Climatic Conditions
- o MIL-STD-810 Environmental Test Methods
- o MIL-STD-1388 Logistic Support Analysis
- o PAM 750-21 Logistic Support Modeling
- o TM 38-710 Integrated Logistic Support Implementation Guide for DOD Systems and Equipments
- o TM 38-703-3 Integrated Logistic Support (ILS), Maintenance Engineering Analysis Data System (MEADS)
- o MIL-STD-470 Maintainability Program Requirements (For Systems and Equipment)
- o MIL-H-46855 Human Engineering Requirements for Military Systems, Equipment and Facilities
- MIL-STD-480 Configuration Control Engineering Changes,
   Deviations and Waivers
- o MIL-STD-721 Definition of Effectiveness Terms for Reliability, Maintainability, Human Factors and Safety

#### SECTION 2.0

# BIT/BITE APPLICATION TO SYSTEM MAINTENANCE

#### 2.1 MAINTENANCE LEVELS

Within the Department of the Army, four categories of maintenance are used. These categories are:

- o Organizational Maintenance
- o Direct Support Maintenance
- o General Support Maintenance
- o Depot Maintenance

The categories are used to designate the scope of maintenance to be performed at the various command levels. Army regulation AR 750-1 defines these maintenance categories as follows:

#### a. Organizational Maintenance

Organizational maintenance is the responsibility of the unit commander in maintaining the operational readiness of equipment assigned or under his control. This category of maintenance includes preventive maintenance services and those organizational level repairs authorized in appropriate technical publications.

#### b. Direct Support Maintenance

Direct support maintenance normally is assigned to and performed by designated TOE or TDA maintenance activities in direct support of using organizations. The repair of

end-items or unserviceable assemblies is performed in support of using organizations on a return-to-user basis.

## c. General Support Maintenance

General support maintenance normally is assigned to and performed by designated TOE or TDA maintenance units or activities in support of individual Army area supply operations. This category of maintenance constitutes the principal materiel overhaul means available to the Field Army Commander in maintaining his materiel assets. General support maintenance units and activities repair or overhaul materiel in accordance with maintenance standards for each item to obtain ready for issue condition based upon the supported Army area supply requirements. When required, general support maintenance units may provide support on a return-to-user basis for equipment beyond the capacity of direct support units.

#### d. Depot Maintenance

Depot maintenance normally is assigned to and performed by designated TDA industrial-type activities or commercial contracts. This category of maintenance assists in satisfying total Department of the Army material requirements by overhaul or rebuild of unserviceable assets requiring maintenance beyond the capability of general support maintenance units or activities. Depot maintenance may be performed overseas during wartime as necessary and feasible to support military operations in general or for specific commodities.

Performance of corrective maintenance at any level of maintenance requires test equipment. The basic division in test equipment is either on-line test or off-line test using either manually operated or automatic

test equipment. An effective organizational level on-line test capability using BIT provides for an improved effectiveness at the other maintenance levels when the total system test requirements consider all levels of maintenance. BIT at the system level can be a useful test when utilized at other maintenance levels.

## 2.2 TESTABILITY REQUIREMENTS

Testability has those characteristics that permit verification of system performance and the isolation of faulty components or subsystems to some appropriate pre-determined level.

With today's complex weapon systems, the need to design for testability is recognized as a basic mandatory requirement to be levied on all new equipment design in order to meet the established maintenance goals. The incorporation of testability into the equipment design is basic in satisfying a maintenance concept that accounts for the appropriate support trade-offs and levels of maintenance actions required for a particular weapon system.

Design for testability must consider all levels of maintenance from Organizational, Direct Support, General Support to Depot Level and address both the hardware aspects of the system as well as the software. Testability at the Organizational Level can utilize on-line test with BIT and performance monitoring systems or self-test functions. At the other maintenance or repair levels, testability can be accomplished using off-line test equipment including ATE as well as BITE that can function independent of the total weapon system. A combination of approaches can be used to implement testability at the different maintenance levels.

Early development of testability into the basic design and management attention to this is essential to accomplishing the overall testability requirement. Of equal concern is the need to establish a common system test design that is not only comprehensive but compatible

with the ATE selected for the particular weapon system. Without a common testability approach the cost and complexity may be prohibitive.

The design for testability shall be included as an integral part of the system engineering effort. The requirements or specifications for testability must be established in the early stages of the system design. Program management should ensure that testability requirements are contractually imposed on the equipment developer.

Testability of prime equipment design is directly related to the degree of engineering emphasis placed on the design from its inception and continued throughout its development. The initial design must contain provisions for testability and supportability features which lend themselves to improved operational readiness while implementing sound system engineering design principles. Functional designs should provide for complimentary overlapping testability features, integrated with BIT and ATE compatible design features.

In designing for testability, the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a significant task. The FMEA affords a check to determine that the system will not be adversely affected by a malfunction and will determine the level of repair. In addition, BIT requirements are specified and the failure modes are defined.

The failure Mode and Effects Analysis is further discussed in Paragraph 3.11 of Section 3.0.

#### 2.3 BIT/BITE VERSUS ATE

The Built-in-Test and Built-in-Test Equipment are not in competition with Automatic Test Equipment; rather, both are essential elements in the system concept. Such considerations as state-of-theart, weight, cost, test time, and mission readiness requirements dictate the trades that must be made by the design engineer in determining the use of BIT/BITE and ATE as well as manual testing. The

design engineer must be responsible in his design for specifying the requirements for both BIT/BITE and ATE as part of a total weapon system concept.

During the initial equipment design, BIT can be incorporated with relative ease. Much of today's electronics contain a microprocessor or computer which further simplifies the incorporation of readiness testing as well as diagnostics testing. If the equipment development has progressed beyond a certain point, it may be necessary to utilize external test equipment even though it may be more costly than having incorporated BIT during the initial equipment design.

#### 2.4 BIT COMPATIBILITY WITH ATE

Test requirements must be established at the weapon system level. The requirements for testing must be analyzed at that level for coherent tests between maintenance levels and to obtain duplicate test results. Where BIT is used to further isolate the failure in order that the part be repaired, the BIT tolerance band must be wider than that for ATE. To do otherwise, the failure detected by BIT will not be verified by the ATE. The never ending circle is obvious - with the unit returned to operation after ATE verifying its proper operation and BIT again rejecting it. Figure 1 depicts the widening tolerance band between levels of maintenance. Note also the increase in the test equipment tolerance or accuracy maintenance levels.

### 2.5 SYSTEM MAINTENANCE CONCEPT REQUIREMENTS

This guide is not intended to define the maintenance requirements for any given weapon system in either specific or generic terms. The formulation of the weapon system requirements are first defined by life cycle goals. For a system being replaced by a newer and updated system these goals could be:




Figure 1. Tolerance Cone

- o Less equipment
- o Less maintenance at a specific maintenance level
- o Fewer operating personnel
- o Fewer replaceable line items

The maintenance concept is based on meeting specific life cycle goals which are established at the system level. The concept defined to achieve these goals could be:

- o Maximum use of operating personnel at organizational level for maintenance with minimum skill required.
- o Replacement at major assembly level utilizing easily removable plug-in assemblies.
- o Minimize number of spares required at Organizational Level Maintenance.

The above are examples of system goals and maintenance concepts that could be established at the system level. In addition, the use of BIT and BITE could be defined as a maintenance requirement to meet specific system goals. Both program management and designers should consider the use of BIT/BITE as a means of effectively meeting established life cycle cost goals and the ensuing maintenance concept.

In many cases a system requirement which is established to meet a specific life cycle cost goal may not be as realistic in real life as intended. For example, a maintenance system dictates the use of BIT/BITE and its design is based on a specific skill level being available and utilized for the maintenance actions specified. Faced with a volunteer Army, and possibly supplemented with draftees during

a crisis, it is certainly possible that the skill level required is either not available or exists at the low end of the scale in capability. It behaves the designer, when incorporating BIT/BITE into the system design, to consider worst possible case and design accordingly.

Weapon sophistication remains our edge over the enemy, and the electronics in today's weapon system leads in both state-of-the-art and sophistication. The availability of skills needed to maintain not only today's weapon systems but those of tomorrow will continue to be a major problem. Weapon system designers may not be able to design less sophisticated circuits but the design of BIT into these circuits must address, in-depth, the skill problem facing today's Army.

#### 2.6 BIT AS A DESIGN REQUIREMENT

Ideally, the requirement for incorporating BIT into the basic design should be a contract requirement imposed at the program level. Even more basic would be that the total weapon system concept recognize the requirement for BIT. This is not to imply that unless there is a basic program requirement or contractural authority specifically for BIT that it cannot be incorporated into the design. To satisfy other system requirements may well dictate the use of BIT. The implementation of BIT into the basic equipment design could be done to meet availability requirements, maintainability goals, mean-time to repair goals, test requirements, etc.

When BIT is specified as a system requirement, it is important that it's incorporation be an inherent design of the basic electronic unit. The early introduction of the test and maintenance requirements into the initial functional design will result in an effective BIT design. This will require that the design engineers be equally qualified in the design for testability as they are in the system design. Since this is not always possible or practical, it is necessary that the design engineers in their respective disciplines maintain a closely coordinated effort to

achieve the desired results.

Incorporating BIT into the basic equipment design can be an effective means of increasing weapon system availability and readiness while reducing the level and complexity of maintenance. Other advantages include a reduction in supporting test equipment including ATE, reduced maintenance and other logistics support costs, and improved fault isolation capabilities.

Although BIT designed into the basic system will increase the front-end design costs, the trade-off in availability and reduced maint-enance costs will more than offset any disadvantages. The total life cycle cost of the system that incorporates a well engineered BIT design will be considerably improved over the system without BIT.

# SECTION 3.0 BIT REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS

#### 3.1 THE SYSTEM ENGINEERING PROCESS

The system engineering process is defined as "a logical sequence of activities and decisions which transforms an operational need into a description of system performance parameters and preferred system configuration. One of the tools used as part of the system engineering process is design-to-cost (DTC)/life-cycle cost (LCC) trade-off analysis. This analysis assists in optimizing system configuration and making those tradeoffs between system performance parameters and cost in a way which minimizes the operational impact of these decisions. This process optimizes system configuration from the maintenance point of view by establishing the most favorable modularity for the specific maintenance concept being evaluated. The definition of replaceable and repairable units is part of this general process which affects both design-for-testability and built-in-test (BIT) design goals. Thus, both on-line and off-line automatic testing requirements become part of the trade-offs associated with developing the system configuration. Specific automatic testing applications are evaluated as elements of the alternative configurations and maintenance concepts used in the optimization process."3

Beginning with the basic system concept defined through operations research and technical feasibility studies and the initial system requirements having been set forth, the operational and functional requirements are defined and translated into progressively more detailed operation and support functional sequences. Ultimately through iteration, a detailed set of performance requirements will be compiled and used as a common base in specifying design requirements, performance specifications, test requirements, logistic support, etc. If the system is to be contracted to industry, the requirements analysis would be conducted to that level necessary for preparation of those specifications required for contract definition.

As the program develops, complete analysis would be required including the Logistics Support Analysis (LSA) which encompasses all aspects of the system end-item design including performance requirements for the end-items and their components. Within the system engineering process the analyses, including LSA, is conducted on an iterative basis throughout the acquisition cycle. The program size, complexity, and schedule will determine the number of iterations and the depth required:

The BIT requirements analysis is a portion of a total systems approach that includes a test requirements analysis supported by an overall system level requirements analysis and the logistics support analysis. There is no formalized methodology for conducting a BIT Requirements Analysis such as there is for the Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) as defined in MIL-STD-1388. However, there is a need for this analysis for the purpose of verifying that the requirements for fault detection and fault localization are satisfied. Items that must be looked at during analysis for determining the requirements for BIT are identified in this section. Much of the information needed is developed from the LSA and other formalized analysis.

### 3.2 SYSTEM OPERATION

The system designer must be responsible for the integrated design of all elements of a system if it is to meet the system operational requirements. Overemphasis or underemphasis on a particular aspect of a system can result in not meeting the systems requirements for both its operation and its supportability. From a system standpoint, the design of any element is interdependent with the design of any other element in the system. The design of any system, subsystem, or end-item should not proceed without consideration of the design of the other systems, subsystems, and end-items. While specific operational requirements may vary between systems, it is necessary that all systems be integrated if a coherent design is to be realized.

As with an integrated system design to meet specific operational requirements, the BIT requirements must be established at a system level and be integrated with all aspects of the system design, operation, and support requirements. BIT can not be an afterthought during the prime equipment design but must be an integral part of the system design and operation. Overall test conditions must reflect the true system operating conditions if BIT is to effectively monitor the readiness status of the weapon system.

#### 3.3 MAINTENANCE CONCEPT

The maintenance concept provides authority and guidance to the maintenance planner. The concept establishes the levels of maintenance, types of maintenance, and maintenance constraints. The concept covers possible failures that may occur at any point during the scheduled activities covered by the operations concept. The maintenance concept embraces the non-success path and is primarily concerned with the treatment of unscheduled events or failures so that the system can be returned to the success path. Scheduled maintenance such as lubrication, coolant replacement, and time sensitive parts replacement are also covered by the maintenance concept.

The preliminary maintenance concept provides a functional description of the tasks required and designates the maintenance level at which each task will be performed. The concept is hardware oriented and thus portions are keyed to the functional elements defined in the system functional analysis. The concept is the result of trade-off studies and as such is an integral part of the system concept optimization. It is really the cornerstone of the structure against which all cost elements are determined and establishes the level at which line replaceable units (LRU's) will be repaired. The preliminary maintenance concept is the key element of life cycle costing and determines the best way to maintain the prime weapon system.

The maintenance concept is flexible in that it allows for multiple concept levels for different systems, e.g., missile, fire control, launcher, etc. During development of a maintenance concept, a trade-off analysis is a vital part if optimum benefits are to be realized. As the program develops, these trade-offs are progressively refined. The maintenance concept becomes a major driving factor in determining the maintainability considerations such as performance monitoring using BIT/BITE, on-line versus off-line test equipment, component interchangeability, modularization, accessibility, criticality, standardization, and human engineering factors.

Including the requirement for BIT in the initial development of a maintenance concept is the most cost effective method of incorporating BIT into the basic design. The need to implement BIT into the weapon system as a means of achieving life cycle cost goals may not be apparent if the logistic support analysis, as specified in MIL-STD-1338-1, is not performed. This guide has been prepared with the assumption that this analysis, which is required for all major acquisitions, will be performed. Failure to apply this standard and other specified standards will affect the usefulness of this guide.

#### 3.4 REPLACEABLE UNITS

required as determined through the system analysis and reflected by the maintenance concept. The level of testing required will vary between systems. As an example, the level of testing for an inertial guidance system, packaged as one major assembly, could be tested at the overall system level with the replaceable unit (RU) being the complete assembly. In a communications system, the RU could be a plug-in card assembly. BIT can be designed to detect and isolate faults down to the chip level, if required, depending on the maintenance concept. At the organizational maintenance level the fault isolated by BIT should be to one easily replaceable module whether it be a system, subsystem, assembly, or card. During

development of the maintenance concept the level of repair, storage of replacement units, and skill level required will be considered in determining the replaceable units.

While defining the BIT requirements for the RU, it is important that other testing requirements be considered. Compatibility with both automatic and manual test equipment should be a mandatory requirement for all electronic and electrical equipment design. Functional and diagnostic test points should be provided to allow testing at the RU's connector. When test requirements need additional circuit data for fault isolation, and test points through the connector are not available, circuit probe points should be provided.

#### 3.5 TEST REQUIREMENTS

The test requirements document (TRD) (Ref MIL-STD-1519) is the foundation for the identification of the test program, procedures, and equipment. The TRD is the result of the test requirements analysis, which is part of the logistic support analysis, and should be accomplished early in the program to avoid the time and cost penalties incurred by delaying until the equipment is designed.

The key to successful testing is the development of a formal analysis resulting in consistent test procedures and requirements within well defined boundaries. Through the incorporation of BIT, to satisfy test requirements together with requirements for both automatic and manual testing that are compatible with BIT, the equipment reliability and availability are improved. In addition, more accurate and faster fault isolation can be accomplished thereby ensuring that the necessary performance test requirements are met. In view of the benefits that can result from both BIT and ATE, it is even more important that accurate and well-organized test requirements be provided. As with any analysis, the output is a reflection of the quality of the input data. The effort expended on obtaining and/or developing quality input data will be well worth it in terms of an improved output.

#### 3.6 FAULT ISOLATION

The level of BIT required to locate the malfunction is directly related to the mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) requirement for the system. The total repair time at the organizational maintenance level is the sum of the following basic steps:

- o Location
- o Isolation
- o Removal
- o Replacement
- o Checkout

The above five steps assume that the LRU (line replaceable unit) is the major assembly level. If plug-in units within an assembly are the RU then two additional steps of disassembly and assembly are required. These seven steps are:

- o Location
- o Isolation
- o Disassembly
- o Removal
- o Replacement
- o Reassembly
- o Checkout

The use of BIT at the organizational maintenance level can virtually eliminate the location time and the isolation time. The design of BIT into the weapon system design should be such that the fault can be isolated to one specific major assembly that is easily removed and replaced. If further isolation of the fault is required through the use of additional test equipment, either automatic or manual, then that maintenance should be limited to general support or depot level maintenance. System readiness and availability are of prime importance. It is necessary therefore that in maintaining operational readiness, the BIT be designed to fault isolate to one major component and that removal and replacement of that one component can be accomplished within a minimum of time.

With the use of BIT the checkout time, the last step in returning a system to a readiness state, can be significantly reduced especially when the fault was initially detected by BIT. The checkout step could include alignment, calibration or other adjustments. At the organizational level, these activities should be avoided whenever possible. Not only could these tasks require a higher skill level than needed for the system operation but the time required could exceed that allocated for returning the system to a readiness condition. It is important to remind ourselves that the most sophisticated weapon system is useless if it is not on-line. When faults do occur, the time required to correct should be the very minimum within cost considerations.

### 3.7 EXTERNAL TEST EQUIPMENT INTERFACE

The design of the basic system must consider the interface requirements for external test equipment, be it ATE or manual. Depending upon the size and complexity of the program, interface control drawings and documentation may be necessary. The interface control drawing would depict the interrelationship of the end-item physical and functional design characteristics.

In addition to the interface requirements between the prime equipment and external test equipment, the interface between the BIT design and external testing must be considered. The information available from BIT could be data that is required to be used for external testing, either automatic or manual.

From past experience, interface problems can be both costly and time consuming during development and testing. Problems can be minimized through early definition of the external ATE and the specific interfaces with BIT. The extensive use of computers and microprocessors in today's weapon systems can reduce the interface problem between BIT and ATE to a software programming problem providing the information available from BIT and any additional information required by ATE is available at the connector interface.

## 3.8 BIT PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

The process which leads to the definition of system performance requirements starts with the translation of system mission requirements into basic functional sequences of operations to describe how the mission will be accomplished. The determination of total system requirements begins with identifying and analyzing the functions required to operate, control, maintain, support, produce, assemble, integrate, test, and deploy the prime mission equipment as a basis for determining the performance and design requirements for supporting equipment, facilities, procedures, skills, and logistics support. The analysis being an interative process will progress through more detailed requirements until complete performance requirements are identified.

How each system level function is to be accomplished must be broken down into both qualitative and quantitative performance requirements to be levied upon each system element. System or subsystem performance standards are the basis for verifying, during the system test and evaluation program, that the system design meets the stated performance requirements.

Based on the maintenance concept and through analysis, quantitative requirements are defined for BIT (and/or BITE). The following are examples of typical BIT performance requirements, some of which are taken from existing Army Missile Systems:

# o Fault Detection

Not less than 98 percent detected by the operator using BIT.

or

Given a faulty system, the probability of a "failed" indication shall be not less than:

90 percent for missile with "X" seekers

80 percent for missile with "Y" seekers

95 percent for missile less seeker

90 percent for launcher electronics

95 percent for "Z" system electronics

and/or

Given a faulty system, the probability of a "good" indication shall be not more than:

10 percent for missile with "X" seekers

20 percent for missile with "Y" seekers

5 percent for missile less seeker

10 percent for launcher electronics

5 percent for "Z" system electronics

or

Given a good system, the probability of a "good" indication shall be not less than 98 percent.

or

Given a good system, the probability of a "failed" indication shall be not more than 2 percent.

or

BIT shall detect failures (and out of tolerance) which represent at least 90 percent of the system (or subsystem) probable failures.

# o Fault Localization

Not less than 98 percent localized by operator using BIT.

## o <u>Availability</u>

The BIT design shall have an operational availability of not less than 95 percent when operating in the system environment.

or

The maintenance man-hours for both preventive and corrective per equipment operating hour ratio of 0.002 or less.

#### o Repair Time

The time to repair a system with BIT at the Organizational level is another way to state the BIT availability.

#### o MTBF

The MTBF of the BIT design shall be at least a factor of two in improvement over the prime equipment design.

or

The MTBF of the BIT shall be not less than 500 operating hours.

# o <u>Reliability</u>

Reliability in an expression of MTBF of the system.

# o False Alarm Rate

The false alarm rate of BIT shall not exceed 3 percent of the fault detected.

### o Maintainability

The MTTR will be "X" minutes from fault detection.

The above quantitative BIT performance requirements are intended as examples only. Each Army Missile System Program must develop their specific performance requirements tailored to that system.

#### 3.9 COST CRITERIA

Life Cycle Cost (LCC) analysis is a basic tool used in the evaluation of logistics resource requirements and is used in conjunction with such items as system effectiveness and technical performance in determining cost effectiveness. The LCC serves to define areas of high support costs as a result of design decisions, defines the impact of operational requirements or support policy alternatives, and provides a means for evaluating built-in test versus external support equipment

be it ATE or manually operated test equipment. Whenever possible, cost factors should be based upon pertinent data provided by the procuring activity from surveillance of operational systems.

It is essential that the method of supporting the weapon system be carefully considered because of the significant effect of support on the total program life-cycle cost. It is important that both BIT and external test equipment be looked at in order that the optimum approach or mix be identified and the cost trade-offs be performed.

In performing trade-offs of candidate designs to determine the extent of BIT and/or external test equipment to be used, the appropriate trade-off elements must be defined and weighed, and the performance and/or cost parameters they effect have to be calculated. As a genera! rule, the incorporation of BIT into the system as part of the basic prime system design will improve system availability and reduce the total life-cycle cost.

## 3.10 SKILL LEVELS AND MANNING REQUIREMENTS

The Logistic Support Analysis (LSA) identifies the personnel, training, and skills required for support of the weapon system and support equipment. Coordination should be maintained with the design activity so the effect of design changes can be reflected in the training plan. The analysis provides identification of the requirements for trained operators and support personnel for all levels of maintenance. Personnel and training data resulting from the LSA include number of personnel required, the skill levels, skill specialties training requirements, and training material required.

The incorporation of BIT into the basic design for providing a system readiness check and for fault location and isolation should result in a lower personnel skill level required at the Organizational maintenance level. The design of BIT into the basic equipment should address the skill levels and manning requirements to minimize both of those requirements.

#### 3.11 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS

An analysis of significant importance in optimizing a design for testability is the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). The FMEA assures that malfunctions will not adversely affect the system. It provides a check to determine the level of repair and the BIT requirements for that system. In addition, the specific functional failure modes and their effects are defined. The FMEA is a continuing effort, affecting system and equipment design and the logistics support system.

The first requirement in the performance of an FMEA is to establish the basic performance, safety, maintenance, and inspection criteria and to identify the elements of the functions of a system, subsystem, or component to the appropriate level in relation with the established criteria. This is accomplished through the establishment of detailed equipment and functional block diagrams of the system and its operation.

For each of the identifiable element or functions, the failure modes and their effects will be determined. The effects will be considered in three categories as follows:

- o The effect of the failure by itself without consideration of other realted components or functions.
- o The effects of a failure in combination with other elements of the system or other functions so as to determine if there is a compounding or accumulation of results.
- o The effect of the failure on the total system or subsystem operation.

It is this identification of the failure effects in an orderly and logical manner that provides the ability to evaluate the systems operation in terms of testability, preventive maintenance, periodic inspection, BIT requirement, and reliability.

The initial failure analysis is performed on a preliminary design and examines functional failures at the subsystem level. The critical elements identified are assigned priority for further examination to identify assemblies and subassemblies that may fail with mission critical effects. These items are investigated in detail as to failure modes and failure rates of components and parts. Prompt attention is thus directed to design improvements in the sensitive and most responsive areas. These critical areas also become candidates for incorporation of BIT.

In general, the following tasks and requirements are directly related to or dependent upon the results of the FMEA.

- o BIT requirements
- o Test plans and procedures
- o Design reviews
- o Math model reliability prediction and allocation
- o Reliability demonstration tests
- o Preventive maintenance and maintainability
- o Logistic Support Analysis
- o Hazard and safety analysis

The FMEA is a valuable tool for assessing the need and the adequacy of BIT. The initial FMEA based on the preliminary design will provide the optimum tool for the identification of BIT requirements. It is recognized that program management may delay and/or eliminate the requirement for FMEA due to cost constraints. It should be recognized,

however, that the longer this analysis is delayed the more difficult it becomes to influence the basic design up to a point where it is no longer cost effective to do so. It may be expedient to delay or even eliminate the FMEA requirement, but to do so is to ignore the total life-cycle goals.

It should be noted again that failure to apply the analysis tools discussed in this section will affect the usefulnes of this design guide.

# SECTION 4.0 BIT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS - GENERAL

#### 4.1 BIT DESIGN CHECK LIST

Self-test provisions shall be an inherent design of the weapon system electronic equipment and provide for performance evaluation and fault isolation. The use of such BIT designs shall not jeopardize the operation or performance of the specific electronic equipment.

The intention of this provision is as stated in MIL-STD-415:

"BIT provisions shall be added to an item for the sole purpose of testing the item. They shall be simple in design and operation, accurate, easily maintained, preferably more reliable than the circuit providing performance, and shall not degrade the performance of the item in which they are incorporated.

BIT provision shall provide optimum convenience of use and operation. The design of controls and readout devices shall be such that they can be easily used and interpreted by low skill personnel."

The designer incorporating BIT into the basic equipment design needs to consider some basic BIT requirements, many of which are needed as inputs to the system and logistic requirements analysis. As a guide to the BIT designer, the following checklist is provided<sup>1</sup>.

- The number of test points which should be monitored on a semicontinuous basis
- b. The number of test points which should be monitored daily, weekly, and monthly

- c. The number of test points which should be monitored on a demand-basis only
- d. The number of test points which are required to isolate failures or indicate trends at the black-box, module or subassembly, printed-circuit board, part, or circuit levels
- e. The number of test points which can be converted to dc voltage (0 to  $\pm 10$  Vdc) using resistive dividers only and the degree of accuracy required
- f. The number of test points which can be converted to dc voltage (0 to ±10 Vdc) using active resistance networks and the degree of accuracy required
- g. The number of test points requiring ac-to-dc conversion and the degree of accuracy required
- h. The number of test points requiring AF-to-dc conversion and the degree of accuracy required
- i. The number of test points requiring RF-to-dc conversion, the frequencies, and the degree of accuracy required
- j. The number of test points requiring RF power-to-dc voltage conversion, the ranges, frequencies, and the degree of accuracy required
- k. The number of test points requiring VSWR-to-dc voltage conversion, the maximum VSWR expected at what frequencies, and the degree of accuracy required

- The number and types of other monitor converters which are required
- m. The number of test points which require some kind of stimulus generators
- n. The number of test points which can be contact closures to ground, the required current capacities, and the voltages to be switched
- The number of test points which can be contact closures to available power, the required power, current capacity, and voltages
- p. The number of test points requiring signal generators, the frequencies, the amplitudes, the degree of wave purity, impedances, and the degree of accuracy required
- q. The number of test points requiring pulse generators, the amplitudes, load impedances, pulse widths, rise times, fall times, tolerable droop, polarities, and pulse trains
- r. The number of test points requiring special stimulus generators and their types
- s. The cost of each converter listed in items e. through 1.
- t. The cost of each stimulus generator in items m. through r.
- u. The MTBF of the system as designed
- v. The MTTR without BIT
- w. The mean-down-time (MDT) without BIT

- x. The MTTR with BIT
- y. The MDT with BIT
- z. The MTBF for BIT
- aa. The overall system MTBF with BIT
- bb. The MTTR BIT shall be low, i.e., 10 minutes maximum
- cc. The amount of spare memory available for software testing
- dd. The amount and kind of interconnecting hardware required
- ee. The coupling and isolation problems which are anticipated for each test point
- ff. The kind and level of noise which can be tolerated at each test point
- gg. The contribution to total power consumption due to BIT
- hh. The impact on equipment modularity as a result of additional hardware functions provided for BIT
- ii. The impact of additional BIT circuitry on equipment temperature profiles, cooling requirements, and other environmental factors
- jj. The opportunity to substitute microprocessor system elements for hardwired BIT control and monitoring functions

Some of these items are taken from the BIT Design Guide prepared for the Chief of Naval Material, NAVMATINST 3960.9.

kk. Passive BIT circuits monitor key points of a system without the need for signal injection. The greater percentage may monitor dc voltages or ac signals that are to be present. The system need not be interrupted for BIT evaluation purposes.

Active BIT systems inject a signal at a given point (such as the input of a radar receiver), and measure the response at an output port. In most applications the system would not be in an operational mode during these tests.

Whichever approach is used depends upon the scenarios of possible applications and whether such interruptions can be tolerated. The choice of methods must be determined from these aspects at an early time of the system design phase: Should I interrupt, or is it better to use passive methods?

11. When designing BIT circuitry, bi-stable multivibrators or flip-flops are often used. During a power-up phase the logic states of these elements are random, unless special precautions are taken. Temporarily false data "bits" may trigger a malfunction alert during this period. A reset function must be initiated. This can be avoided by either time-delay or builtin reset circuits.

It is also important to avoid the automatic premature shutdown of a circuit because a vital, related section was not yet operational at a given instant during turn-on. Force-fail circuits are often activated by a BIT failure in another section. BIT failure activation must be retarded and the time delay specified for each such related assembly during the early design phase of the system. Interchangeability requirements demand such considerations.

- mm. The BIT shall have high reliability circuits on the order of 100,000 hours MTBF.
- nn. The BIT architecture and test algorithms shall be standardized throughout the weapon system equipment.
- oo. The BIT indicators shall be readily visible to the operator.
- pp. The BIT circuitry shall be resident on the same functional module in which it is monitoring whenever possible.
- qq. The incorporation of BIT shall make maximum use of existing microprocessors and/or computers within the system.
- rr. The incorporation of BIT into the weapon system shall have no effect on the functional circuitry, shall not effect the safety of operation, and shall fail passively, i.e., be fail safe.
- ss. Calibration or alignment of BITE circuitry shall be limited.

The BIT performance requirements in Paragraph 3.8 contain additional items to be considered by the equipment designer when incorporating BIT into the weapon system.

### 4.2 BIT SPECIFICATIONS AND GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

The design of BIT is a complicated process. BIT includes every concept used to detect and isolate a fault and provides a means for checking the system readiness without the use of external test equipment. The complexity of BIT ranges from the indicator lamp that lights when an equipment power switch is turned on to the use of a resident computer for the generation of test signals and evaluation of the system response. BIT can be continuously operated, interleaved with other operations or initiated on

command. It includes hardware sensors, software, and firmware. Its particular mechanization and utilization in a system are of course determined by the designer and the system requirements resulting from analysis. The careless design of BIT can result in a near useless system ignored by the operator and maintenance personnel.

BIT can be categorized in several different ways such as:

- o Purpose, i.e., detection, isolation correction and/or prediction
- o Active versus passive
- o Functional levels tested
- o On-line versus off-line versus interleaved
- o Inductive versus deductive
- o Centralized versus decentralized

The result is a matrix of possible BIT classes with each class having its use to meet a designers particular need. In most cases a combination of classes will be used as the most cost effective means of meeting specific requirements. A brief discussion of these six categories of BIT follows.

# 4.2.1 Purpose

There are two main purposes for BIT. One is to detect a failure which also serves the function of isolation to a specified, predetermined level, as an aid to maintenance. The other function of BIT is to correct a failure. This can be accomplished by a failure triggering through BIT the transfer from a failed module to a redundant module. Failure prediction can also be performed by BIT in such areas as a vibration

level being an indication of an imminent failure.

# 4.2.2 Active Versus Passive

The interrogation of a module by a test signal and then evaluates the response is an example of active BIT. Passive BIT would monitor system performance without generating a test signal.

# 4.2.3 Functional Level Tested

BIT can be designed to test at the system level, subsystem module level, printed circuit board, or even the part level. The level depends on both the maintenance concept and the resulting system level analysis and the logistic support analysis. The maintenance requirements and the associated life-cycle cost trade studies will determine the appropriate functional level or levels for BIT.

# 4.2.4 On-Line Versus Off-Line Versus Interleaved

On-line passive BIT is in operation while the system is operating. Off-line active BIT will check the systems operation while the system is not performing its mission. It is also possible that the active BIT is used when the system is operating but a particular module is not operating; in fact an entire system can be tested without interrupting operation. This is referred to as interleaving BIT. Interleaving can be an effective means for maintaining system confidence without disrupting a mission for specific testing. BIT can be used to indicate failures, be used to monitor the well-being of the system, and assist in locating a malfunction. The designer must decide the combination of BIT required for the specific system based on analysis and systems concept.

# 4.2.5 <u>Inductive Versus Deductive BIT</u>

Inductive BIT concludes that if a specific set of measured functions are within their stated tolerance limits then a single unmeasured function must also be within its stated tolerance limit.

Deductive BIT assumes that if a certain function is within a stated tolerance limit then all the variables involved in generating that function must be within their stated tolerance limit.

# 4.2.6 <u>Centralized Versus Distributed</u>

Centralized BIT would be individual systems together with a central computer or microprocessor which controls the system and can provide interleave tests. Usually less hardware is required in the centralized BIT.

If each BIT circuit has but one function, such as test one module, it is distributed. Distributed BIT has the advantage that a system can be taken off-line and continue to use BIT for further failure diagnosis.

The most important of all "General Design Requirements" is that BIT CANNOT be considered an afterthought. As discussed in Section 3.0, BIT must be an integral part of the design process and be considered in the concept definition and included as part of the formal (and informal) analysis.

Important general design considerations and items that should be considered for inclusion in the specifications for BIT are the following:

- o Availability Requirements
- o Reliability Requirements
- o MTTR
- o Fault Definition
- o Detectability Level

- o Fault-Isolation Level
- o False-Alarm Rate
- o Self-Test Requirements
- o Extent of Operator Participation
- o Software Constrains (Memory Capacity)
- o Design-Growth Limits
- o Design Cost Goals
- o Fail-Safe Provisions
- o Fault Indicators
- o Special BIT Features
- o Calibration Requirements

The reliability of BIT should exceed that of the hardware being tested. If this is not the case, the probability of failure of the BIT may be almost as great as the probability of failure of the unit under test. A failure in the BIT circuit should not affect the weapon system performance. Whenever feasible, the BIT input and output should be sufficiently isolated from the normal channels so that any failure in the BIT will not cause a system failure. The use of high-reliability and burned-in parts as well as integrated circuits is recommended.

BIT should be kept as simple as possible but be as effective as required to meet operational needs. The type circuitry use for BIT should be, if feasible, the same type used in the basic system.

The BIT protective circuitry should be designed to be fail-safe, i.e., fail passively. As an example, if a wire breaks or a connector is left disconnected, the fault will be detected and the system protected. All possible input-stimuli combinations, when economical, should be considered to eliminate the possibility of a good condition fraudulently indicating a fault. Self-test of BIT is an important consideration since an undetected BIT failure which incorrectly indicates a system failure will increase maintenance time by directing the maintenance personnel to the wrong area.

# 4.3 TESTABILITY DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

Design for testability (DFT) is a basic objective to be levied as a requirement by the Army on all future missile systems. Improved operational readiness and reduced operating and support costs can not be realized unless DFT becomes a contract requirement similiar to system performance. It is difficult to specify reasonable and cost-effective restability requirements that can be contractually stated and enforced. The following design guides are generic in nature and represent the typical standards that exist throughout industry. It is suggested that they serve as a basis for defining testability design requirements for both the designer and the procurement activity.

# Module Layout

o Provide sufficient space between adjacent components and place components in a standard prientation

# Edge Connector

- o Utilize a standard connector with keying capability
- o Use a standard location for common function, e.g., power, ground, and analog signals

- o Provide adequate edge connector pins for the control and visibility of the circuits
- o Ensure that adjacent connector pins cannot short and cause damage to the circuitry on the modules

# <u>Partitioning</u>

- Design modules into easily testable functional partitions do not divide functions between two or more modules
- o Isolate analog and digital circuitry
- o Subdivide large logic circuits with low visibility into partitions

# Test Points

- o Provide sufficient test points for fault diagnosis/visibility
- o Types DIP pins, external connector, stand-offs, and pads
- O Also consider space for IC locations, built-in multiplexer for selection of test points, and shift registers to shift out test point data

# Noise Propagation

o Provide adequate decoupling of voltages at each IC or group of IC's and at module connector

# Supply Voltages

- o Minimize the number of voltage supplies per module
- o If more than one voltage supply, ensure that a random turn on/off sequence will not damage module circuitry

# Logic Families

o Minimize logic families if possible; if not, choose components that are compatible both electrically and mechanically

# Input/Output Interface

- o Ensure that an additional 60 pF load will not adversely affect performance of modules during testing
- o Provide minimal load on board input signals and maximum drive capability on output signals
- o Buffer clock and reset lines along with flip-flop and latched outputs

# Initialization

- o Provide reset (set) lines for efficient external initialization of memory elements
- o Avoid self-initializing counter
- Avoid the connection of set and clear inputs to the same signal elements

# Logic Race and Timing

- o Design for worst-case timing
- o Avoid designs whose functional operation will involve logic race and timing

# Free-Running Clocks

o Allow for the disablement of internal free-running clocks and the insertion of an external test clock signal

# Feedback Loops

o Segment digital feedback loops on modules such that during testing the loops can be opened and testing performed on both the segmented and closed loop

# Bused Logic

- o Allow for visibility and control of bus
- o Avoid use of wire AND's and OR's in the circuit design

# Adjusting Elements

o Avoid the use of potentiometers and adjustable capacitors

# <u>LSI</u>

- o Provide for the control and visibility of all functions associated with microprocessors and memory elements
- Consider the utilization of a socket for complex LSI's
- o Provide a means for the control of the board activity rate

# 4.4 ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOKS

The Engineering Design Handbook Series of the Army are a coordinated series of handbooks containing basic information and fundamental data useful in the design and development of Army materiel and systems. The handbooks are authoritative reference books of practical information and quantitative factors helpful in the design and development of Army materiel so that it will meet the tactical and the technical needs of the Army.

Appendix A contains a list of these handbooks as of May 1979, with both the AMC Pamphlet number and the Defense Documentation Center\* and National Technical Information Service (DDC/NTIS) document number.

#### 4.5 REDUNDANCY

Design for redundancy must consider the criticality of the function to a particular mission or operation as well as the impact on maintainability, testability, and program life-cycle costs.

The existing technology of large-scale integration (LSI) circuits allows for easy incorporation of redundancy as well as BIT into a new design without an appreciable impact on weight, size, and even component cost. Prior to the integrated circuits, cost, weight, and size were a deterrent to incorporating redundancy. In existing equipment, including redundancy would in all probability prove to be very costly.

A trade-off analysis must be performed to establish the redundancy for a particular electronic design. The criteria which will impact the trade-off decision to incorporate redundancy at either the system level or the circuit or function level are:

- o Reliability requirements
- o Mission essential functions and availability criteria
- o Minimum level of allowable degraded modes
- Backup requirements, either manual or automatic
- Maintainability requirements
- o Testability limitations

<sup>\*</sup> DDC is now called the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC)

- o Human factors including available skill level of personnel for maintenance, in particular at the Organizational level
- o Weight, size, and cost
- o Impact on circuit functions including electromagnetic interference
- o Logistic support including spare requirements

Incorporation of redundancy at the system level, the function level, the unit level or the component level should not be an arbitrary decision by a designer but should be subjected to a deliberate and formal review, coordinated with and part of an overall systems and logistic support analysis.

Redundant circuits may be active or passive. In either case, BIT should be utilized to provide the following:

- o Provide a performance evaluation of both circuits.
- o Provide information to the system operator that one of the redundant circuits (or systems, components, etc.) has failed. This information should be provided even if there is an automatic switch-over from one circuit to the other.
- o Provide information to the operator if there is a deterioration in one of the circuits.

In the event computer software is used to provide voting functions and to indicate automatic transfer between redundant circuits, the data processing design must take into account the expanded memory requirements.

#### 4.6 FAULT TOLERANCES

A circuit analysis should be conducted to determine the acceptable tolerance levels for each electronic unit. Use of a nominal fault tolerance parameter measurement for all levels of testing will not be acceptable. It will be necessary to take into account the tolerance limits of each functional chain, thereby providing for the allowable cumulative variations at the various levels of maintenance and repair. Figure 1 represents this tolerance cone or tree.

The functional tolerance limits of each test level shall be assigned early in the design phase and reviewed in conjunction with the level of repair identified by both the LSA and the maintenance concept.

# 4.7 BUSING AND SIGNAL FAN-OUTS

Busing and signal fan-outs may be necessary in circuit designs to allow for multiple source/sync signal conditioning and logic transfers. Busing techniques are commonly used in interface communications between subsystems and internal to the electronic units for such things as power, grounding, enabling circuits, sync or clock signals and the like.

Testability and ambiguity considerations are largely influenced by this design feature, and special attention needs to be given in the incorporation of BIT so that unambiguous isolation of the fault can be determined. Failures from circuits using common busing can cause a large group of fault indications involving many systems, subsystems, and units. The BIT designer must be especially aware of this situation and design BIT so that the actual fault is isolated to the specific unit.

The BIT capability for circuits such as power sources, clock circuits, sync signals, etc., should be designed so that the specific signal can be monitored independent of the functional circuit. This can be accomplished, through automatic initiation by BIT, to isolate the signal at its source.

Often the failed condition can be isolated in a power-off state through resistance measurements. This type testing for fault isolation lends itself to the off-line testing using ATE or manual test equipment. The designer of BIT must consider the need for external testing and be compatible with it.

Failures resulting in loaded, shorted, or open conditions present a different situation where testing at the signal source will not isolate the failure should the fault be downstream from the source. Again the designer incorporating BIT must consider this situation. Assuming a centralized computer, software programming can readily isolate the fault.

#### 4.8 SOFTWARE VERSUS HARDWARE

Today's technology favors the computer or microprocessor and software approach over that of hardware especially as related to traditional analog circuitry. Many of the current hardware functions have been reduced to software algorithms and transfer functions.

Software plays an important role in testability designs and can offset the added production cost of a hardware approach. While the software up-front costs may be high, it is foolproof once developed, and over the life of the program can be cost effective resulting in a lower-life cycle cost.

Once the decision has been made that BIT will be included in the weapon system and the level of BIT defined, it must then be determined to what extent hardware and/or software will be used in implementing the BIT system.

Hardware in the form of hardwire has its place in BIT. An example would be a power-on indicator light. Hardwire logic circuits are standard in many circuits, and even with a more sophisticated software approach, the use of hardwire in a BIT system has its application. A drawback using a straight hardware approach is that fault isolation requires that the operator

(Organizational level) or maintenance personnel be provided procedures and troubleshooting aids as BIT in this situation will not necessarily fault-isolate to a replaceable unit.

Software on the other hand offers many advantages. Software, of course, implies using a computer or microprocessor. Many weapon systems contain a computer for its operational functions. In this situation, if the computer can be shared between the operational and test functions, the cost associated with including BIT can be minimized. In those cases where a system computer is not available, the microprocessor can be a very cost effective approach.

The software approach for BIT offers many advantages. It can offer a complete system check automatically, including fault-isolation to the RU level. In addition, the software can be modified to accommodate system changes. With software there is the additional capability of a memory system which can be useful in identifying a system (or component) deterioration prior to failure. This aspect of using software can provide the designer with a very powerful test tool.

Several considerations should be kept in mind when designing a BIT system using software.

- o It is essential to isolate the system data from the test data. This is true for both the input as well as the output. If the test signals are not inhibited at the output, they may be misinterpreted by the interfacing hardware as a command or as fraudulent data.
- When monitoring the output of a given functional area, it is essential to provide adequate tolerance. The amount of tolerance will depend upon the specific application.

- o The input stimuli should be kept at a minimum level to minimize their effect upon performance. Input stimuli should be chosen to closely resemble normally accepted data. Therefore, if data are supplied inadvertently to an interfacing unit, a malfunction will not be created in that unit. Also, stimuli should not be selected so as to cause fraudulent commands which might be detrimental (i.e., firing commands, etc.).
- Existing data networks should be used whenever possible. This will greatly reduce cost and also provide testing of interface circuitry.
- o The key optimized fault isolation is judicious selection of monitoring points. Whenever possible, a common monitoring point should be utilized to test more than one functional area.
- o The possible increase in computer size which may be necessary for the inclusion of BIT must be considered when initially designing the total system.

#### 4.9 MICROPROCESSOR AND BIT

The addition of special circuits to a complex system for the purpose of performing BIT has, as a goal, the detection and diagnosis of faults. If the system design objective is a long-term MTBF then the BIT information can be used to switch to a good spare. The system designed to provide a low MTTR can use BIT information to pin-point the failed part.

The microprocessor is an attractive candidate for use in BIT applications since it offers the potential for a flexible approach to testing as well as a means of standardizing BIT hardware over a wide range of modules. The microprocessor may be used for such things as

parity and other code comparisons as well as statistical characterization and dynamic signal verification.

The incorporation of BIT is a useful approach in meeting the reliability and testability goals established for the system. The ability to accurately evaluate total life-cycle costs will determine if the microprocessor can be applied as an effective BIT element.

# SECTION 5.0 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

#### 5.1 DESIGN OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of designing a built-in-test (BIT) capability into the communication sections of a weapon system is to increase the probability that required informational transfers will be accomplished within the proper time periods. This goal is reached by maintaining the current status of all functional elements in the communication system so that alternative routings can be selected if performance degradations or failures should occur.

Additional benefits expected from the inclusion of BIT are:

- o Reduction of the possibility that information may be misinterpreted due to degradation or failure of elements in the communications link.
- o Improvement in the MTTR of the system.
- o Provision of failure information to assist and speed the repair of problems.

# 5.2 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Communication systems interface with most of the other sections of a weapon system and handle a variety of data. They operate with frequencies as high as light waves and as low as dc, with power levels from microwatts to megawatts. This can make it difficult to verify the proper operation of some areas. However, most areas can be checked through the careful selection of sensors and associated circuitry or by inference through the operation of interfacing stages.

Often the communication links between various elements of a weapon system will consist of multiple channels, many of which perform similiar functions. This offers a redundancy potential that usually is not available with other systems. However, to properly utilize this potential the overall system must be designed for that type operation and needs a BIT capability to assist operator control of data routing. If automatic operation of the system is intended, then BIT is required in order for the system to function. It may not be identified as such by the designed and may not provide complete indicator outputs, but the monitoring and fault detection circuitry must be there to enable automatic transmission link selection.

As the complexity of weapon systems increases, the nuber of data channels required also increases. Because many of these channels are functionally similiar and do not require full time data flow, it becomes feasible to multiplex some of the data channels and reduce the number of transmission circuits. This creates a unique situation for BIT since a single test point can be used to monitor several data channels. The evaluation of the signals from this test point can be quite complex and could require elaborate and costly circuitry if performed conventionally. However, the availability of inexpensive microprocessors provides an excellent method of performing this task along with other BIT functions if desired. There may already be microprocessors in the weapon system with spare capability that could be utilized for this or other similiar BIT requirements.

Communication systems quite often are spread over large areas with different sections separated by considerable distances, thus making it difficult to perform certain tests. For example, it may not be feasible to transmit a test pattern over a circuit and back to the origin for checking in real-time since this would require a separate return circuit. It may be necessary to store the test pattern and send it back over the same link for verification or it may not be possible to perform the test.

An additional unique characteristic of communication systems is their dependence on the ionosphere, which is an external, uncontrollable factor for some radio frequency links. This can produce a circuit that operates intermittently during adverse propagation conditions, which requires that failure monitoring circuitry be able to discern between these conditions and equipment failure. Otherwise, operator intervention will be necessary when the link appears inoperative.

#### 5.3 PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS

The design of a communication system should include BIT to provide a quick and reliable indication of the system status to the user. He needs to know whether the system is functioning; and if not, to what degree its capability has been degraded. The design of the BIT should be such that a measure of the systems operation is constantly available to the user to assist his operational decisions.

To enable a BIT system to be properly implemented, a valid set of performance specifications must be established. It is important for a failure to be indicated only when the communication system has experienced a hard failure or a degradation that prevents the reliable operation of a system element. A system is normally designed to performance specifications that exceed the operational requirements for the system to ensure adequate performance after some degradation in the field. This allowable field degradation is usually part of the performance specifications and establishes a basis for setting BIT threshold levels. The performance of the system may decrease below the expected field degradation level and still operate acceptably. This would be a worst case level of operation for the system and a better no-go threshold for BIT. This threshold must be set at the proper level because too high a setting would generate excessive failure indications and result in unnecessary maintenance. Conversely, a BIT threshold level that is too low could allow a system to degrade below an acceptable operational level and be unable to accomplish its mission before a failure is indicated.

Threshold levels are more often applied to analog circuits because they generally exhibit a graceful degradation of performance with time. Digital circuits usually operate properly or not at all. However, in data transmission over communication circuits the error rate can increase gradually until it crosses a threshold of useability. A measure of this error rate can provide a good overall digital circuit test.

# 5.4 ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

When BIT circuits are being designed and BIT threshold levels are being established, consideration must be given to effects produced, by the operational environment. This should include not only temperature, humidity, shock, and vibration but also susceptibility to radiated and conducted electromagnetic energy. Since some communication systems utilize high power transmitters, the BIT circuitry may be subjected to sufficient energy levels to shift their operating points and cause false indications of failure or inability to detect actual failures. Electromagnetic environmental requirements should be specified so that designers can include the necessary shielding, filtering, and packaging to prevent operational problems.

# 5.5 BIT CONSIDERATION

Implementing BIT in communication systems requires consideration of many of the same factors that must be evaluated for the other sections of a weapon system. In addition, elements peculiar to communication systems must be considered, such as whether or not to measure the noise level of a receiver. Trade-offs will be necessary between the percentage of BIT coverage, the added reliability introduced, the improved maintainability, and the cost of the additional circuitry.

# 5.5.1 BIT Coverage

It is common practice to replace entire systems or subsystems when a failure is detected during testing. This is usually required

because the level of instrumentation is not adequate to isolate the failure to a module within a system. One result of this is a costlier spares inventory.

Figure 2 shows a typical data receiver block diagram. This receiver could be constructed on one circuit board, but more likely it would be divided into two or three sections. A typical arrangement would have blocks A, B, and C on one board, blocks D, E, F, and G on a second board, and block H on a third. If each board is properly instrumented, a failure could be isolated to a single board and only that board replaced. Otherwise, the entire receiver would be replaced.

The extent to which BIT is implemented can be carried below the circuit board level if desired. For example, if board one for the receiver in Figure 2 consists of blocks A, B, and C, it might be instrumented at points 1 through 5. A failure in the oscillator (block C) would cause improper readings at points 4 and 5. The board would be replaced at the organizational level and the failure indication passed along to the direct support organization to assist in its repair.

The percentage of coverage for BIT is determined through coordination of the failure mode analysis, the weapon system maintenance plan, and interrelated cost considerations.

# 5.5.2 BIT Self-Test

Testing of BIT circuitry can be accomplished in several ways. One of the better approaches is to build into the circuits the capability for self-testing. In most BIT monitors a test input or a control lead can be added which will allow the circuit to be actuated externally, thus verifying its operation from that point out to the indicator. For analog input circuits the test input can sometimes be the input used for calibrating the circuit. Figure 3 shows possible circuits with self-test inputs for analog and digital BIT monitors.






Figure 2. Typical Data Receiver Block Diagram





B. DIGITAL MONITOR

Figure 3. Typical BIT Self-Test Inputs 60

Manual or automatic testing of BIT circuits can be utilized depending on the particular weapon system design philosophy. If a central computer is used to control the BIT system, then a desirable mode of operation would be for the computer to sequentially actuate the test input to each monitor and verify its output. An alternative would be to actuate all monitors simultaneously and scan each one for the proper output. Manual testing of the BIT circuits can be accomplished by applying the input stimuli manually and verifying that correct outputs occur. In either case, outputs of BIT circuits which control events such as shutting off power due to overvoltage must be disabled during testing.

# 5.5.3 Fail-Safe

BIT circuitry should be designed to be as fail-safe as practical. The monitor input should be configured so that a high level represents normal operation and a low level represents a failure. A loss of signal into the monitor would produce a low input and a failure indication. Therefore, a bad connector, a broken wire or, in some cases, a short circuit would also appear as a fault to the BIT system.

Other fail-safe possibilities include the use of redundant circuits and voting circuits. Because of requiring additional hardware, these approaches would probably be used only in critical areas or where high reliability was specified.

#### 5.6 COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

A communication system is used to transmit control and data signals between the various elements of a weapon system. These signals will primarily be digital and can be carried over cable links and air links. Digital data is transmitted in either a parallel or a serial format. The parallel formal requires a circuit for each bit in a data word and generally uses a second group of parallel circuits for management functions. This type of data bus is often used by a computer central processing unit to interface with other equipment and is useable to a maximum distance of about 15 meters.

Only one circuit is required for transmission of data in a serial format. Data bits are transmitted sequentially along with additional bits for protocol functions and error detection, when used. When more than one channel of data is required, several possibilities exist. If time permits, each channel can be sent in sequence over a single circuit. When simultaneous transmission is required, a separate circuit can be used for each channel or all channels can be multiplexed onto a single or minimum number of circuits.

Most communication links utilize radio frequency emissions, metallic conductor cables, or fiber optic cables to convey information between locations. RF links are used for long distances and for communicating with moving vehicles. Metallic conductor cables have traditionally been used for interconnections between fixed points. However, fiber optic cables are being used increasingly because of their light weight, wide bandwidth, and resistance to interference.

#### 5.7 ERROR DETECTION

Several techniques are available to detect errors in transmitted data. One method requires repetitive transmission and comparison of each character. Voting logic can then be used for corrections. An obvious disadvantage to this method is the increase in transmission time required.

The most commonly used method is the parity bit. By adding a bit at the end of each data word, all words can be made to have an odd (or even) number of logic "ones". Any word that deviates from this pattern has an error. No information is included for correcting errors so retransmission of bad words or the entire message may be necessary when errors occur.

Another technique for detecting errors is transmission of the data back to the sender for verifying. This can be accomplished over the same circuit when the quantity of data and time constraints allow. Otherwise, a second circuit will be required.

## 5.8 SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT APPROACHES

# 5.8.1 Modems

Modems are used at each end of data circuits to interface between interconnecting cables and user equipment when long cables are involved. They contain the circuitry needed to convert data into audio frequency signals, one for a logic "l" and another for a logic "O", for transmission over cables, and circuitry to convert back to logic levels for reception. They also contain circuitry for operational control such as end-of-transmission detection.

Modems are used for full duplex and for half duplex circuits. A full duplex circuit uses different audio tones for send and receive which allows simultaneous transmission in both directions. A half duplex circuit uses the same frequency tones for send and receive and therefore only operates in one direction at a time.

A full duplex circuit can be tested by transmitting a known message over the system and back to the origin for checking. This would be done in a test mode and would verify the send and receive functions at each end of the cable. A half duplex circuit can be tested in a similar manner except the message must be stored at the remote end and then transmitted back to the origin. Continuous testing of just the modems can be accomplished by the addition of some circuitry. When a modem is transmitting, a receiver could convert the audio frequencies back to digital data for comparison. When a modem is receiving, a second receiver could operate in parallel with the modem receiver and their outputs compared.

# 5.8.2 Line Drivers and Receivers

Line drivers and receivers are used to transfer data over cables up to approximately I kilometer long. The maximum allowable distance is a function of the data rate and environment. Line drivers and receivers are available in two distinct groups; one for unbalanced lines and the other for balanced lines. The unbalanced drivers and receivers evolved from standard logic circuits and operate with data signals on a single line referenced against system ground. Balanced line drivers accept normal logic inputs and generate differential outputs while balanced line receivers reverse the process. The differential signal does not depend on system ground for a reference, so it provides good rejection to common mode noise and level shifts of the ground system between each end of the line.

The best test of a complete circuit is the loopback test where the data is returned to the origin for verification. This of course requires a second circuit for real-time testing or storage if the same circuit carries the data in both directions. The individual line drivers and receivers could be continuously monitored but any reliability increase would not be worth the increase in complexity. Therefore, this approach is not recommended.

# 5.8.3 Encoders and Decoders

An encoder is used to convert data into special formats, such as Manchester, to increase the resistance to noise or to improve synchronization and clock regeneration at the receiving end. A decoder performs the reverse by converting data back from a special format to non-return-to-zero (NRZ). Regeneration of a clock signal in synchronization with the data stream is also generally performed by the decoder circuitry.

Testing of encoders and decoders can be performed separately or as part of the communication circuit. The complete circuit can be tested using the loopback method where the received data is returned to the origin for verification. This type of testing may not be feasible except in a

test mode. Continuous testing of an encoder could be performed by decoding its output and comparing this with the input data stream. A decoder could be tested continuously by paralleling a second decoder and comparing the two outputs.

# 5.8.4 Receivers

A block diagram for a receiver configured for receiving data is shown in Figure 2. This receiver could logically be divided into three sections with blocks A, B, and C on one circuit board, blocks D, E, F, and G on a second circuit board, and block H on a third circuit board. Test points 1 through 11 are identified as possible BIT monitor points. Due to the frequencies and amplitudes involved, some of these test points will be very sensitive to any additional circuitry. Test points 1 and 2 are especially sensitive and are not recommended for BIT monitoring.

The outputs of the first and second oscillators can be monitored by simple RF detector circuits which would convert the signals into do levels proportional to their amplitudes. The downward then go to level detectors that would generate fault indications if the signals fell below present values. If the receiver is intended for operation on more than one channel, the first oscillator could have an external frequency control input. If it is desired to verify that the oscillator switched to the proper frequency, then a much more complex BIT circuit would be necessary. One possibility is a discriminator with a do output proportional to the input frequency. This output would go to the input of a comparator with a trip point controlled by the frequency control input to the oscillator.

The output of the first mixer, test point 5, will be a low level signal and will need amplification before a simple amplitude detector can

be used. However, integrated circuits are available that were designed as IF amplifier-audio detectors and should be suitable for converting the mixer output to a dc level that can be connected directly to a comparator. A failure will be indicated when an input signal to the receiver is not present.

The outputs of the first IF, the second mixer, and the second IF should have sufficient amplitudes so that simple detectors can be used to convert the signals to dc levels. These levels should then be compared to reference values to verify that adequate signals are present. Again, a failure will be indicated when an input signal to the receiver is not present.

The demodulator/bit synchronizer shown in block H is similar to the receive half of the modems described in paragraph 5.8.1. The usual input is two audio frequency tones which must be converted into serial digital data. A clock signal is generated and synchronized with the incoming data in the bit synchronizer portion. As with the modem, it is necessary to duplicate the circuitry and compare the two outputs to verify proper operation.

# 5.8.5 Transmitter

A block diagram for a typical data transmitter is shown in Figure 4. Many variations are possible in the exact way the functions are accomplished but the general arrangement should be similar. A power supply is not shown but would be necessary to provide the proper voltages. This supply would be monitored with BIT circuits as described in Section 8.0 of this design guide.

The numbered test points on the block diagram are possible measurement locations for BIT monitors. A simple detector circuit to




Figure 4. Typical Data Transmitter Block Diagram

convert the signals to dc levels can be used at locations 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, and 11. The dc levels would then be measured by threshold detectors to verify that the signals exceed minimum requirements.

The tone generator shown in block A is similar to the transmit portion of the modem described in paragraph 5.8.1, and for the most effective results, should be tested the same way. This would require that a demodulator circuit convert the output at test point 2 back to a digital signal for comparison with the input. A simpler test that would only verify the amplitude of an output at test point 2 would be performed as described in the preceding paragraph.

If the transmitter is intended for operation on more than one channel, the second oscillator (block F) could have an external frequency control input. Verification that the oscillator switches to the proper frequency will require more complex BIT circuitry. One possibility is a discriminator with a dc output proportional to the input frequency. This output would go to the input of a comparator with a trip point controlled by the frequency control input to the oscillator.

The directional coupler (block J) produces two dc outputs; one proportional to forward power and the other proportional to reflected power. The difference in these two parameters is a measure of the output from the power amplifier in block I. The signals from the directional coupler are used by the output control circuit to maintain a constant power level out of the transmitter and to protect the power amplifier. This is accomplished by reducing the output as a function of the reflected power, which is an indication of a problem with the coaxial cable or antenna.

The directional coupler outputs should be monitored by BIT circuitry. This will require amplifiers because these outputs are generally less than I volt in amplitude. If the transmitter design does not include

blocks J and K, a directional coupler should be added for the BIT circuit. An indication of the transmitter output can be obtained from an RF detector connected to test point 12, but this is not the recommended approach.

## 5.8.6 Antennas

Communication system antennas will generally be fixed with omnidirectional patterns or directional with a mechanical positioning system. BIT can monitor to verify that positioning systems respond properly to movement commands. The output of the selsyn at the antenna can be compared with the command to determine if the proper movement is indicated. This method assumes that the antenna selsyn is operating correctly. If verification of the selsyn is also desired then a separate position monitoring device, such as a gear-driven potentiometer, can be added.

Antennas should be matched to the impedance of the coaxial cable and both the receiver and transmitter. With a receiver it is not a cirtical factor, and a change in impedance will only result in a decrease in received signal strength. However, with a transmitter a mismatch will cause power to be reflected back to the transmitter which can damage the output stage. If the transmitter has a directional coupler in the output it can be used to monitor the antenna system. If not, one should be added so that reflected power and its relation to forward power can be continuously monitored. A threshold should be established for indicating a failure condition but the actual values should be periodically recorded. By tracking these measurements the condition of the antenna can be monitored and the failure point can be predicted, allowing maintenance to be performed at noncritical times.

# SECTION 6.0 GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

The guidance and control system is one of the most critical components of a weapon system in regards to system performance requirements. The guidance and control system must perform satisfactorily throughout the mission, not only to steer the weapon to within the lethal range from the target, but also to provide control over other components of the weapon system such as the propellant system.

Because of its complexity, the guidance and control system is a prime candidate for incorporation of BIT and BITE, primarily to minimize fault detection and isolation times and thereby maximize weapon system readiness and availability.

The most widely used types of guidance and control systems are electronic (inertial guidance and control or radar tracking), electro-optical (video or laser tracking), and infrared (heat seeking). The inertial guidance and control system is ideally suited for weapon systems used against fixed targets when it is desirable to have no inflight radio communications with the weapon system. The infrared guidance and control system is used against mobile and fixed targets that emanate radiation in the infrared spectrum or that reflect infrared when illuminated by an external source. The radar, laser, and video tracking systems are used against either mobile or fixed targets that do not radiate.

### 6.1 SYSTEM OPERATION

# 6.1.1 <u>Inertial Guidance and Control System Operation</u>

An inertial guidance and control system is a highly complex electro-mechanical system, which continuously computes the vehicle velocity

and position, and the direction and range to a predetermined target. Figure 5 shows a typical inertial guidance and control system. The heart of the system is a stable instrument platform with freedom of rotation about three orthogonal axes. Each axis is controlled by a gyro-controlled servo loop. These servo loops maintain a desired platform attitude with respect to the earths surface. The instrument platform holds, in addition to the gyros, accelerometers to measure vehicle accelerations along each of the platform axes.

An on-board computer integrates the accelerometer outputs to obtain vehicle velocity and distance from the launch site, and provides torquing signals to the gyros to maintain the proper platform orientation. By preprogramming the computer prior to launch with the launch and target coordinates, the computer can determine the vehicle's present position and range and direction to the target. The computer provides the steering signals to the vehicle autopilot and can also provide shutdown signals to the propellant system, based upon vehicle velocity and desired flight pattern.

## 6.1.2 Radar Tracking System Operation

A radar tracking system utilizes the reflection of electromagnetic radiation from the target to determine range and direction to that target. Figure 6 shows a typical radar guidance and control system. A pulse generator provides the basic timing of the system; namely, the pulse to control the transmit phase, and sync signals to the computer to determine the time delay between transmit and receive signals and to the antenna phase control. The antenna phase control shifts the radiation pattern of the antenna between successive transmissions. In this manner, four successive transmissions will radiate in four orthogonal directions slightly displaced from the vehicle logitudinal axis. The difference in signal strength of the received signals from these transmissions is used by the computer to derive the direction of the target and to generate the proper steering signals to the vehicle autopilot.




Figure 5. Inertial Guidance and Control System Block Diagram




Figure 6. Radar Guidance and Control System Block Diagram

## 6.1.3 Laser Tracking System Operation

The laser tracking system operation is almost identical to the operation of the radar guidance and control system. The major differences are that the radiation is in the optical spectrum instead of the RF spectrum, and lens systems are used instead of an antenna.

## 6.1.4 Video Tracking System Operation

A video tracking system, as commonly used on air-to-ground missiles, requires manual intervention to provide the steering signals to the missile. A forward-looking TV camera is mounted in the nose of the missile, and electrical outputs of the camera (sync and video signals) are transmitted to the launch vehicle via radio link where they are displayed on a video screen to the operator. The operator then uses a joystick to send the desired steering signals to the missile via a return radio link.

# 6.1.5 Infrared Tracking System Operation

The infrared system is a passive-type guidance and control system which detects and tracks infrared (heat) radiation emanating from the target to steer the missile to that target. The system may also be used against targets that do not generate infrared radiation, provided that a forward observation post can illuminate the target with infrared radiation and the target reflects a detectable portion of the illumination. The heart of the system is a detector array capable of detecting not only the radiation but also the angular difference between the direction of the target and the missile longitudinal axis. In most systems the angular difference is measured in two orthogonal directions, transverse to the missile longitudinal axis. The guidance computer measures these angular differences and transmits steering signals to the missile to reduce the errors to zero.

#### 6.2 GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATION

Since the tactical mission of a guidance and control system is to control and steer the weapon system to a point which is within lethal range of the target, overall system accuracy is a prime consideration in the establishing performance requirements for the guidance and control system, along with environmental and reliability considerations. During the conceptual phase of initial design, trade-off studies must be performed to establish individual component performance criteria which will satisfy the overall system performance requirements.

# 6.2.1 Inertial Guidance and Control System Performance Requirements

The accuracy of an inertial guidance and control system is dependent to a great degree on the performance of the inertial instruments and their associated servo loops. Accelerometer sensitivity must be sufficient to measure slight accelerations, and the scale factor and bias must be controlled to minimize errors in determining velocities and distances. Critical parameters for the gyros are: sensitivity, which must be sufficient to prevent large platform pointing errors under acceleration and vehicle maneuvering; gyro drift, which must be minimized to prevent accumulative platform pointing errors; and torquing scale factor. Gyro spin motor excitation must be controlled to prevent extraneous gyro drift from changes in angular moment. If the gyro spin mass. In addition, the computational capability of a quidance computer must be sufficient to determine vehicle position and velocities to the degree of accuracy required by the mission.

### 6.2.2 Radar Tracking System Performance Requirements

The performance of a radar tracking system is determined by its maximum range, pointing accuracy, and its range determination. The maximum range is dependent on the peak output power of the transmitter, the receiver sensitivity, and the frequency stability of both the

transmitter and receiver. The pointing accuracy is dependent on the antenna alignment and the beam width or the radiation pattern of the antenna. The accuracy of the range determination is mostly dependent on the stability and granularity of the timing circuits, and to a lesser degree on the antenna beam width which should be narrow enough to minimize reception of all signals except direct reflection from the target.

# 6.2.3 Laser Tracking System Performance Requirements

The performance requirements for a laser tracking system are almost identical to those for a radar tracking system with the difference that an optical system is utilized instead of an antenna.

# 6.2.4 Video Tracking System Performance Requirements

The critical parameters in a video tracking system are: the optical alignment of the camera to the vehicle axis; the field of view of the lens system; and the sensitivity of the camera, which determines its ability to provide a usable video image to the operator at extreme range and under various light conditions. The depth-of-field and/or focus of the lens system must be adequate to provide a clear image of the target area.

# 6.2.5 Infrared Guidance and Control System Performance Requirements

The range and accuracy of an infrared guidance and control system is largely determined by its sensor array. The sensitivity of the infrared detectors must be great enough to detect the target radiation at sufficient range to allow missile maneuvering, yet not great enough to lock onto erroneous sources. Where multiple detectors are utilized, the sensitivity of each should be balanced to the extent that a target directly ahead will provide equal outputs from all detectors. The field-of-view of the sensor array should be narrow enough to exclude

general background radiation and enable lock-on to an individual target and wide enough to allow detection of the target within a reasonable pointing angle from the missile flight path.

### 6.3 ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS

Since guidance and control systems are partially or wholly contained in the missile airframe, their design considerations must include the missile environment. This environment includes shock and vibration, acceleration, temperature and moisture extremes, and barometric pressure variations. Size and weight of the system, in as much as they affect the range, and aerodynamics of the missile are another consideration.

### 6.4 BIT CONSIDERATIONS

The primary objective of designing built-in test capabilities into guidance and control systems is to increase the probability that the weapon system will be delivered to a point within lethal range of the target. This goal is reached by determining the status of all functional elements in the guidance and control system so that corrective action can be taken in the event of system degradation or component failures.

Additional benefits obtained from the inclusion of BIT are:

- Reduction in the MTTR of the system through improved fault isolation.
- Reduction in skill levels of maintenance personnel.

# 6.4.1 BIT Coverage

In many guidance and control systems, a failure during testing necessitates changeout of major assemblies or the expenditure of considerable man-hours to isolate the malfunction to the modular level. This is

required because the level of external instrumentation is not adequate to isolate the failure to a specific module within the system. This practice results in a costly spares inventory and/or excessive system downtime. With proper utilization of BIT capabilities, failure isolation to modular levels can be achieved.

For the typical inertial guidance and control system depicted in Figure 5, the three gyros, azimuth resolver, accelerometers, drive motors, and angle readouts are all contained within the platform structure. The servo amplifiers are mounted in a second assembly, and the computer is the third major component. With proper instrumentation, such as at points 1 through 11, and selective stimuli applied to each platform axis, a failure can be isolated to a single one of these components. For example: a defective "X" gyro, when torqued, will give erroneous signals at points 1 and 2 when the platform azimuth axis is at zero degrees, and will give erroneous signals at points 1 and 6 for a platform azimuth of 90 degrees.

For each individual guidance and control system, the extent of BIT coverage is determined by failure mode analyses, the weapon system maintenance plan, and related cost considerations.

## 6.4.2 Self-Test

Testing of BIT circuitry can be performed in several ways. In systems that contain digital computers, the computer can be utilized to perform all off-line system testing, including self-check of BIT circuitry with minimal operator intervention. A typical test sequence for this type of system would be as follows:

A computer self-test program consisting of memory tests,
 arithmetic logic tests, and control logic tests.

- o A computer-controlled check of analog and digital interface circuitry with computer outputs tied back to computer inputs. This test would also provide indications to an operator to check output interface circuitry.
- Computer-controlled testing of the entire guidance and control system. This series of tests would constitute the prelaunch test sequence.

# 6.4.3 Fail Safe

BIT circuitry must be designed to be as fail safe as practical. The reliability, as measured by MTBF, should approach an order of magnitude greater than the remainder of the system hardware. In addition, the circuit design should be configured to enhance the operational reliability. For example, digital inputs to BIT should be configured such that an active or high state represents the normal operating state, with a zero or low state denoting a failure. In this manner, poor connections, open circuity, and ground faults are readily detected. Redundant or voting logic type of circuits can be utilized in critical areas where high reliability is a requirement.

### 6.4.4 Prelaunch Testing

Prelaunch testing of guidance and control systems consists of exercising all operational modes of the system and verifying proper responses to test stimuli. The type of tests will vary according to the type of system.

For a typical inertial guidance and control system, the test scenario follows a basic building block of integration and calibration testing:

# o <u>Verification of Platform Control Circuitry</u>

Platform servo locps are tested in both caged and stabilized modes of operation. A gross check of gryo torquing circuits is performed, and the platform angle readout devices are tested for proper output.

### o Instrument Calibration

Using known input stimuli (earth rotation rates and gravitational attraction), gyro torquing scale factors and drift compensation, and accelerometer scale factors and biases are established and/or adjusted.

## o Operational Tests

The system is exercised through a sequence of pseudooperational sequences while monitoring platform angular
errors and computed position. During the level alignment
mode, the platform is torqued by the accelerometers to
achieve zero gravity on the level axis instruments, and
the level axis deviations are measured. In the azimuth
alignment mode, earth rate torquing for a specified
heading is applied to the gyros, the platform is placed
in a gyro-compassing mode, and the final azimuth and
level axis errors are measured and tested to be within
design specifications. In the free-flight mode, the system
operates in its normal post-launch mode, and platform
angle errors and computed position are measured and tested
to be within the specified limits.

For an infrared tracking system, prelaunch tests would include checks of the infrared detector sensitivity and the directivity of the sensor head. These tests require a infrared source as a test stimulus.

This source must be controlled in both the magnitude of radiation and its relative location with respect to the missile.

Prelaunch testing of laser or radar tracking systems would include measurement of the transmitter power and beam width as well as the directivity and sensitivity of the receiver sensors and/or antenna. In addition, a check of the range determination circuitry should be performed using a delay circuit to synthesize a receiver input signal.

# 6.4.5 Post Launch Testing

Post launch testing of guidance and control systems is basically a monitor-type of checking to detect catastrophic failures which could seriously impair the weapon system effectivity. For example, in an inertial guidance and control system the loss of gyro spin motor excitation would result in a loss of stable platform reference and erroneous accelerometer outputs, causing the weapon to veer drastically from the desired flight path. By monitoring the excitation and/or accelerometer signals, the failure would be detected and appropriate corrective action, such as reducing the steering signals to null and aborting any fuze signal based upon a possible erroneous range calculation, could be effected.

# SECTION 7.0 POWER SYSTEMS

#### 7.1 DESIGN OBJECTIVES

The power supply sections of weapons systems should be designed with a built-in-test (BIT) capability to provide an increased assurance of operational readiness at all times. By including BIT, the mean-time-to-repair (MTTR) is reduced, thus providing an increase in system availability. Out-of-tolerance conditions and failures in other parts of weapons systems due to incorrect supply voltages will be reduced with a consequent improvement in reliability.

#### 7.2 SYSTEM OPERATION

Power systems can be divided into three sections: power sources, power converters, and power regulators. Table 1 lists some of the more common types in each division. Some power systems may not require all three sections; whereas, other systems may use multiple combinations of the three. Figure 7 shows a block diagram of a typical power system for a small missile. If the missile had a built-in guidance system it would probably also require 400 Hz ac, and the power system would include a module for converting dc to ac. Some missiles derive their internal power from an Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) which usually operates on high pressure gas stored in the missile. An APU output of 400 Hz ac can directly power the guidance system and can be converted to the proper dc levels for operating other electrical systems.

To reduce the storage requirements in missile, external power is utilized during standby and part of checkout. The system is then switched to internal power for the last part of checkout and launch. The operation of the power system on both external and internal power should be verified with BIT circuitry. The BIT monitors can ensure that internal power is functioning properly before the system is switched from external.




Figure 7. Typical Missile Power System Configuration

Table 1. Power System Divisions

Power Sources	Power Converters	Power Regulators
Batteries	DC to DC DC to AC	Linear Switching
Auxiliary Power Units	AC to DC AC to AC	AC
Motor-Generator Sets		

A motor-generator set is normally used to provide ac power for a fire control unit. The power is routed to the various sections of the fire control unit where converters and regulators provide the particular voltages required by individual pieces of equipment. In cases where several items use a specific voltage such as 28 Vdc, one regulator will operate a bus, and the power will be routed as required. Decoupling filters are then used at each load to prevent undesirable interactions between units. The fire control unit power system should contain sufficient BIT circuitry to continuously define the operational status and pin-point any failures to specific locations.

### 7.3 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Since a power system feeds power to all areas of a weapons system, it is important to maintain continuous monitoring on all outputs. The proper operation of a weapons system is dependent on all voltages being correct. Some equipment also requires the application of voltages in a particular sequence and sometimes with time delays. For instance, a power amplifier tube in a transmitter requires up to 2 minutes between application of filament and plate voltages to allow the cathode to reach operating temperature. Both voltages can safely be removed at the same time. A computer requires that its basic voltage, usually 5 volts, be applied prior to all other voltages and removed after the others. These special time

sequence funtions performed by the power system should be verified by BIT monitors. The BIT circuitry can be programmed to inhibit improper sequences or time delays.

When a failure occurs in a power system output, the voltage may go high and produce catastrophic results in any equipment connected to that output. Crowbar circuits are sometimes used to detect such an overvoltage condition and short the output. This will cause a fuse or circuit breaker to open and protect the loads from the overvoltage. If it is desired to test a crowbar circuit, it must be disconnected from the power supply and stimulated with the required voltage to verify trip action. The trip voltage should be removed and a lower voltage applied to verify that it does not trip below the required point. After successfully completing these two tests, it would be reconnected to the power circuit. A BIT circuit would need to be specially designed for the crowbar test and would only be actuated on manual or computer command.

A BIT monitor normally operates from the power utilized by the other circuits in an area. However, the BIT circuits monitoring power systems need a separate or redundant source of power so that a single voltage failure will not render the BIT circuit inoperative. This is especially important if automatic switchover to backup modules is anticipated.

## 7.4 PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS

Specifications for power system outputs and input power requirements for all other systems must be evaluated to determine realistic settings for the BIT monitors. When several modules operate from a power bus, their input requirements will probably be somewhat different. The most critical of the input requirements must be used for determining the BIT monitor settings.

BIT circuitry should be used to monitor intermediate points within power systems. For example, in Figure 7 monitoring the input and output to each of the three voltage regulators would provide information for isolating a failure to the converter or a regulator. Acceptable performance specifications must be established for all these intermediate points so that limits for the BIT monitors can be determined.

### 7.5 BIT CONSIDERATIONS

Many factors must be considered when implementing BIT into a power system. The goal is to improve the reliability of the weapon system; therefore, BIT circuitry must be reliable itself. BIT design should be oriented for fail-safe operation so that any failures in BIT circuits or interconnecting cables will result in a failure indication. BIT monitors should also include provisions for self-testing so that proper operation can be verified whenever necessary.

The extent of BIT coverage must be established. It will normally extend down to the smallest element that is plug-in replaceable. However, additional test points may be specified in plug-in elements to improve their testability during higher echelon maintenance. The amount of BIT coverage should be determined through coordination of the failure mode analysis, the logistic support analysis, the weapons system maintenance plan, and interrelated cost considerations.

### 7.6 SPECIFIC EQUIPMENT APPROACHES

Power systems will require a diverse series of measurements to completely define their operating characteristics. Predominant among these is the determination that voltage levels fall within prescribed upper and lower limits. This measurement will be required at numerous points in a power system and can utilize a standard sensor that can be programmed for voltage level and polarity. Test point locations and types of measurements for the different elements that comprise a variety of power systems are examined in the following paragraphs.

# 7.6.1 Power Sources

Three general types of power sources commonly used in weapons systems are batteries, auxiliary power units, and motor-generator sets (see Table i). Each type operates differently and therefore presents unique monitoring requirements.

- 7.6.1.1 <u>Batteries</u> Batteries are normally used where a limited amount of power is required and other sources are not conveniently available. They can provide power at a low rate for a long time or at a high rate for a short time. All batteries have internal leakage current which gradually reduces the stored energy at a rate dependent on the internal construction of the battery and the storage temperature. The charge state of a battery should be monitored to ensure that adequate energy is left to accomplish its required task. The BIT circuitry used will vary depending on the type of battery and its intended use. There are many different batteries with varying characteristics, but they can be grouped into two major categories which are:
  - o Prime must be replaced when discharged
  - o Secondary can be recharged when necessary

Both types of batteries should have a sensor to monitor the terminal voltage. This is a reasonable measure of the charge state on most batteries, especially if done under load. Some batteries, nickle-cadmium is a good example, have such a flat discharge curve that is is difficult to determine the charge state from the terminal voltage. On these the voltage measurement does reveal if the battery is completely discharged, if one or more of the cells are shorted, or if the internal resistance has increased so the battery will no longer handle the required load.

Prime batteries in weapons systems are normally replaced at scheduled intervals to ensure that workable batteries will be in place when needed. If BIT sensors are used to monitor the status of these batteries, the confidence level will be increased since early failures can be detected. The BIT circuitry should not obtain its operating power from these batteries but from an external source such as the power that operates the missile circuitry during testing.

When secondary batteries are used to power a system, operational testing can be performed, and the batteries can then be recharged to full capacity to be ready for future use. When long-term storage is required, periodic charging or trickle charging is used to maintain full capacity. The terminal voltages of these batteries will vary over a wide range between the no-load charging situation and the full-load discharging situation. Sensors for two low voltage thresholds and one high voltage threshold are needed to provide adequate monitoring of their condition. One low threshold should be the minimum allowable voltage under load with no input from a charger. The other low threshold should be the minimum acceptable voltage reached during charging, and the high threshold should be the maximum acceptable voltage reached during charging. The output from the sensor monitoring the minimum voltage attained during charging will indicate a failure except for the latter portion of the charge cycle. Consequently, this indication should either be part of a manual test or should be qualified for only the appropriate time periods.

7.6.1.2 <u>Auxiliary Power Units</u> - An Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) should have BIT monitors on all outputs to check for low voltage and high voltage, and when appropriate, for frequency accuracy. Since an APU will be operated only during a launch sequency or for testing, the output monitors can be activated for only those time periods. However, if the missile is also tested using external power in place of the APU, the BIT sensors can also be used to monitor the external power. This will require the sensors to

be connected beyond any devices used to switch between power sources. If it is also desired to monitor the APU output before transferring from external power, then a switching arrangement will be required for the sensors, or separate sensors must be used.

Most APU's derive their power from compressed gas which is stored in a high pressure container until needed. The pressure in this container must be regularly checked to ensure that an adequate supply of gas is available. A BIT sensor can be used to continuously monitor this pressure and provide a status output to a central location. Transducers are available that produce an analog output relative to input pressure or that switch levels digitally at preset values of pressure.

7.6.1.3 Motor-Generator Sets - Fire control units normally receive their operating power from Motor-Generator (MG) sets. When possible, energy from local power grids is utilized, but MG sets are maintained for backup in case of local power failure and become the prime source during emergency conditions. This input power to fire control units will be converted to the various levels required to operate the different systems, but should be monitored at the input to verify that it stays within proper limits.

An MG set consists of a generator coupled to the output shaft of typically a diesel engine. The engine is operated at a relatively constant speed so the generator output frequency will be within tolerance. There are several parameters relative to proper operation of the engine that should be monitored.

- o The amount of fuel remaining
- o The engine coolant temperature

- o The battery voltage
- o The lubricating oil pressure

When commercial power is being used and the MG set is not in operation, the fuel remaining and the battery voltage should continue to be checked to assure system readiness at all times. The BIT sensor monitoring oil pressure would need to be inhibited with the engine not operating to prevent a false failure indication.

### 7.6.2 Power Converters

Power converters are used to change input power to the ac and dc voltage levels required for operating the different sections of weapons systems. They also convert 60 Hz or dc power to 400 Hz when this frequency is needed. The outputs from power converters can be used directly or can be routed through regulators when closer tolerances are required. Four basic types of power converters are listed in Table 1.

The two converters used to provide ac power will normally use switching techniques to maintain high efficiency. The frequency of the output power is held to any necessary tolerance range by use of the proper internal control elements. However, the frequency should still be monitored by a BIT sensor to verify that it is within the desired limits. The amplitude of the output ac is regulated in some converters. In others, the output is directly proportional to the input voltage with additional variations produced by load changes. For these units any regulation must be accomplished external to the converters.

All converter outputs should be monitored with BIT circuitry except where a converter and a regulator are combined on a single PC card. In that case, the converter output should be brought to a test point to improve the testability of the PC card in the event of failure.

# 7.6.3 Power Regulators

Regulators are used to reduce, to acceptable limits, the variations in power provided to equipment. Voltages direct from power sources can vary over a relatively wide range just due to the normal operating characteristics of the sources. For example, the output voltage from a battery can decrease by as much as 15 percent as its energy is depleted. Additional variations will be produced by changes in the load. Some power converters include regulation against input variations and sometimes against load changes on one output. If multiple outputs need regulation or if tighter specifications are necessary, the separate regulators must be used.

There are two types of regulators generally used for dc voltages - linear and switching. Linear regulators provide the best regulation, least ripple, and quickest response to load changes while switching regulators produce the highest efficiency with the smallest and lightest package. The choice of which one is used is based on specific requirements for a particular power system and can be a combination of the two. Both regulator types should have BIT monitors on their inputs and outputs. When more than one regulator is operated from the same power converter output, it is not necessary to duplicate the monitors. A single BIT sensor can monitor several regulator inputs and the power converter output common to them. To prevent duplication, yet provide complete converage, BIT monitors should be specified for power converter and power source outputs rather than regulator inputs.

If overvoltage crowbars are used in the power system, they should be on the outputs of the regulators. This does not obviate the need for BIT sensors on the outputs. The crowbars will provide protection against catastrophic failures; whereas, the BIT sensors will detect long-term voltage changes, either high or low, due to circuit drift. The BIT sensor high threshold level should therefore be set below the crowbar trigger level.

Regulators are sometimes used on 60 Hz ac power to reduce the voltage variations. These regulators normally utilize magnetic principles and consequently are heavy and bulky. They are very reliable but their output should still be monitored with a BIT sensor.

Regulation of 400 Hz ac power is usually accomplished at the power converter when needed. If the converter itself does not regulate its output voltage, this function can be performed by regulating the input to the converter. In effect, a dc regulator ahead of the converter would be controlled by the ac out of the converter to maintain the proper ac voltage. This same type regulation can be used for ac to ac power converters also, since they convert input ac to dc then convert this dc to the output ac. A BIT sensor should monitor the dc level from the regulator output to the converter input.

# SECTION 8.0 BASIC BIT/BITE DESIGN OUTLINE

### 8.1 INTRODUCTION

The outline contained in this section summarizes the steps required for the cost effective inclusion of BIT/BITE in the development of Army Missile Systems. The design procedures are applicable to mechanical/electrical systems and subsystems down to a level of detail dependent on available data and the stage of system design. A prime requirement for the cost effective application of BIT/BITE is that the following design procedures be incorporated early in the system design. Redesign of completed designs is a costly method of implementing BIT/BITE.


BIT systems have been functionally used as go/no-go devices for many years on mechanical, electrical, and chemical systems. However, they were called alarms. Life-cycle costing has emphasized the high cost of maintenance in terms of fault location and isolation times as well as the maintenance skill level required to service modern weapons. Reduction of this cost has led to the requirement that BIT not only provide go/no-go signals, but that fault isolation and fault location times be reduced. This reduction in maintenance time is accomplished by including, in the hardware design, test points, sensors, and indicators to adequately monitor the significant equipment faults that can occur.

### o Adequate Monitoring

Locate and isolate the fault to the replaceable hardware as determined by the level of maintenance being performed.

### o Significant Faults

Those faults with the best chance of occurring and which have the largest fault isolation and location times.



The above requires that BIT equipment be designed to accomplish the work of a highly trained technician, thus reducing the maintenance skill level requirements. BIT system design to accomplish the above consists of:

- o Quantitatively specifying BIT as required by system availability as shown in paragraph 8.2.
- o Evaluating candidate BIT systems based on the system block diagram used for FMEA as shown in paragraph 8.3, and determining that the BIT detectability level specification has been met.

### 8.2 BIT DETECTABILITY LEVEL SPECIFICATION

The performance specifications for BIT are discussed in Section 3.0, paragraph 3.8, of this Design Guide. The BIT level of detectability (k) is of prime importance and is governed by the system availability requirement as defined in Equation (1). Detectability is determined by first computing the joint detectability/maintainability probability kM( $t_r$ ) from which k is set to determine maintainability, Equation (3). The mean-time-to-repair ( $M_{CT}$ ) is then assessed, Equation (4). The details of these steps are as follows:

Availability (operational readiness) of the system as time (ta) is:

$$A(t_r) = R(t_m) + [kM(t_r)][1 - R(t_m)],$$
 (1)

where

 $R(t_{\rm m})$  = Probability that the system will survive the specified mission of duration  $t_{\rm m}$  without failure,

t<sub>r</sub> = Specified turnaround time, or maximum downtime for repair
 of system,

- k = Probability that if a system failure occurs it will be detected during system checkout, and
- $M(t_r)$  = Probability that a detected system failure can be repaired in time,  $t_r$ , to restore the system to operational status.

System analysis determines mission reliability  $R(t_m)$ , mission availability  $A(t_r)$ , and  $kM(t_r)$  is determined from Equation (1) as:

$$kM(t_r) = \frac{A(t_r) - R(t_m)}{1 - R(t_m)}$$
 (2)

 $kM(t_r)$  is the joint probability, given that a system failure has occurred, that the failure will be detected and repaired within turnaround time  $t_r$ .

BIT detectability level (k) is set by system analysis to determine the maintainability requirement as:

$$M(t_r) = \frac{kM(t_r)}{k}$$
 (3)

Equation (3) means that  $M(t_r)$  percent of all system repair actions must be completed within the specified turnaround time  $(t_r)$ .

The mean-time-to-repair  $(M_{\mbox{CT}})$  is computed from the maintainability requirement as:

$$M_{CT} = \frac{-t_{r}}{\ln[1-M(t_{r})]} \tag{4}$$

### 8.3 BIT SYSTEM DESIGNS

Candidate BIT systems for design are derived in a cost-effective manner by locating integral sensors at proper test points for performance monitoring and fault isolation. The test point selection is based on probability of failure data for each functional area so that the measurements are biased in the areas most likely to fail. Naturally sensor feasibility and cost must also be taken into consideration for a cost-effective BIT design. The following paragraphs illustrate a straightforward method of test point (sensor) selection based on the system functional block diagram (Figure 8) used in the FMEA. The design consists of the following:

- o Initially, test points (sensors) are located on all inputs and outputs of the functional areas of the system block diagram.
- o A fault code matrix is made for the sensors.
- o Various sensor sets are evaluated using the fault code and failure data.
- o Finally, the BIT detectability level is computed and evaluated to meet the specifications.

# 8.3.1 Base Test Point (Sensor) Location

A general system block diagram showing inputs and outputs from each functional area is depicted in Figure 8. The functional areas represent electrical and/or mechanical subsystems and correspond to Line Replaceable Units (LRU's) as defined by the level of maintenance. Sensors are shown at each input and output. It should be noted that this is the ultimate in sensor requirements and maximizes the cost of sensors. The object of the following fault code establishment and sensor set evaluation is to reduce the number of sensors required to design a cost-effective BIT system.




Figure 8. General System Block Diagram

FUNCTIONAL AREA SENSOR LOCATION

FA

LEGEND:

# 8.3.2 Fault Code Matrix

No Fault

Based on the system block diagram, a fault code is established. The fault code is a matrix tabulating the functional area failed versus sensor number sensing a fault coded as 0 or sensing a no-fault coded as a 1. The fault code as derived from Figure 8 would be as shown in Table 2.

Functional Area	Sensor No.									
Failed		2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2	1	0	0	0	ו	0	0	0	0	0
3	1	1	] ]	יִ	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	ו	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
5	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0
6	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
7	۲	7	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0

Table 2. Fault Code Matrix

The above fault code is simplified by assuming that all sensors downstream of a fault indicate that a fault has occurred. This is not necessarily true, but the sensor immediately following the failed LRU must indicate a fault for correct BIT fault isolation.

The fault code is evaluated for redundant sensors and the degree of functional area isolation. Columns 7, 8, and 9 of Table 2 are identical, thus two of the sensors are redundant. Also, identical columns 2 and 3 indicate that one of these sensors may be redundant. Redundant sensors can be eliminated if the outputs they are monitoring are 100 percent dependent; i.e., sensors 7 and 8 are monitoring a command output of functional area number 6, and if both sensors fail when this functional area fails, the

outputs are 100 percent dependent. Sensors 2 and 3 are monitoring outputs of FA2. Both sensors will only fail if there is a failure in components common to the two channels. Also similar rows in the fault code matrix show that the sensors cannot discriminate between faults in these functional areas; i.e., failures in functional areas 6 and 7 cannot be localized in the fault code by sensors only. It is necessary to replace one unit, either 6 or 7, and repeat the test to isolate the failure.

Having eliminated the redundant sensors, engineering judgement must be used in terms of failure probabilities to assure that:

- o Sensors isolating frequent faults are most desirable.
- Unique fault code patterns and minimum number of substitutions are most desirable.

The probability of a given LRU failure can be found from:

$$P = 1 - e^{-\lambda T}, (5)$$

where

P is the probability of failure,  $\lambda$  is the failure rate per  $10^6$  hours, and T is the mission time.

## 8.3.3 BIT System Evaluation

The ultimate BIT system, as shown in Figure 8, measures all inputs/outputs, and isolates to the lowest possible level. LRU and sensor evaluation data is used in a straightforward manner to minimize the number of sensors required to meet the BIT detectability specifications. Tables 3 and 4, using the general system block diagram shown in Figure 8, illustrate a method of tabulating the LRU and sensor data required for analysis. This data and the

fault code matrix (Table 2) are the data base from which various sensor sets can be formed for evaluation. The process of evaluation to designate the use or elimination of various sensors is illustrated by the following:

- o Redundant sensors are eliminated by noting duplicate columns in the fault code matrix (Table 2) while taking into consideration the dependency relationship tabulated in column 5 of Table 3.
- o LRU isolation possibilities are found by noting duplicate rows in the fault code matrix (Table 2).
- o LRU candidates are found by evaluating columns 4, 6, 7, and 8 (Table 3). Those with the largest  $\lambda$ ,  $M_{CT}$ ,  $T_{FL}$ , and  $T_{FI}$  are prime candidates for BIT.
- o The sum of columns 2 and 3 (Table 3) is a measure of the number of sensors required to isolate a given LRU. The larger the number of inputs and outputs, the higher the cost in sensors. LRU's with a minimum number of inputs and outputs should be considered for BIT isolation.
- o Sensor failure rates, column 3S of Table 4, must be balanced against the sensor fault indication rate, column 2S, to minimize false alarms. In order words, a sensor failure rate eqivalent to its false alarm rate will result in numerous false alarms by the BIT system and cause mistrust by operational personnel.
- o Feasibility, cost, and computational requirements must be considered to measure the benefits of adding a particular sensor.

- o Column 7S (Table 4) emphasizes the basic past use of BIT as an alarm device.
- o Column 8S (Table 4) is used to evaluate the cost/benefit of BIT.

Table 3. LRU BIT Evaluation Data

1	2	3	4	5	6	7_	8	9	10
(LRU (FA) No.)	(Input Sensor No.)	(Output Sensor No.)	(λ Failure Rate x10 <sup>-6</sup> )	(Output Depen- dency)	(Mean- Time- to- Repair Without BIT)	(Fault Loca- tion Time Without BIT)	(Fault Iso- lation Time Without BIT)	(Maint. Skill Level Without BIT)	(Maint. Skill Level With BIT)
1	-	1	$\lambda_{1}$		M <sub>CT1</sub>	T <sub>FL1</sub>	T <sub>FI1</sub>		
2	1	2	<sup>λ</sup> 2-2	D <sub>2-3</sub>	M <sub>CT2</sub>	T <sub>FL2</sub>	T <sub>FI2</sub>		
		3	<sup>λ</sup> 2-3	D <sub>3-2</sub>					
3	1	5	<sup>λ</sup> 3		M <sub>CT3</sub>	T <sub>FL3</sub>	T <sub>FI3</sub>		
4	3	4	<sup>λ</sup> <b>4</b>		M <sub>CT4</sub>	T <sub>FL4</sub>	T <sub>FI4</sub>		
5	2,4,5	6	<sup>λ</sup> 5		M <sub>CT5</sub>	T <sub>FL5</sub>	T <sub>FI5</sub>		
6	6,8	7	<sup>λ</sup> 6-7	D <sub>7-9</sub>	M <sub>CT6</sub>	T <sub>FL6</sub>	T <sub>FI6</sub>		
	: 	9	<sup>λ</sup> 6-9	D <sub>9-10</sub>					
7	7	8	<sup>λ</sup> 7		M <sub>CT7</sub>	T <sub>FL7</sub>	T <sub>FI7</sub>		
8	9	10	<sup>λ</sup> 8		M <sub>CT8</sub>	T <sub>FL8</sub>	T <sub>FI8</sub>		

Columns 1, 2 and 3 are completed from the system block diagram.

Column 5 is a measure of the dependence (D) of multiple outputs which have common components and is a function of the number of components

and/or failure rates. One-hundred percent dependency between outputs means that if one output fails the other also fails and can be computed as:

$$D = \frac{\lambda_{C}}{\lambda_{C}^{+\lambda}_{D}}, \qquad (6)$$

where

D is the dependency of output i on output j,  $\lambda_{\text{C}}$  is failure rate of components common to outputs i and j, and  $\lambda_{\text{D}}$  is failure rate of components peculiar to the i output.

Columns 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 are completed from FMEA and maintenance analysis data.

Table 4. Sensor BIT Evaluation Data

1S (Sensor No.)	2S (Fault Rate X10 <sup>-6</sup> )	3S (Failure Rate X10 <sup>-6</sup> )	4S (Feasi- bility)	5S (Cost)	6S (Compu- tation Require- ments)	7S (Required for Go/ No-Go)	8S (Mean Time- To- Repair)
1	F <sub>1</sub>	λ <sub>S1</sub>				No	M <sub>CTS1</sub>
2	F <sub>2</sub>	λ <sub>S2</sub>				No	M <sub>CTS2</sub>
3	F <sub>3</sub>	λ <sub>S</sub> 3				No	M <sub>CTS3</sub>
4	F <sub>4</sub>	<sup>λ</sup> S4				No	M <sub>CTS4</sub>
5	F <sub>5</sub>	λ <sub>S</sub> 5				No	M <sub>CTS5</sub>
6	F <sub>6</sub>	λ <sub>S6</sub>				No	M <sub>CTS6</sub>
7	F <sub>7</sub>	λ <sub>S7</sub>				No	M <sub>CTS7</sub>
8	F <sub>8</sub>	λ <sub>S8</sub>				No	M <sub>CTS8</sub>
9	F <sub>9</sub>	λ <sub>S</sub> 9				No	M <sub>CTS9</sub>
10	F <sub>10</sub>	<sup>λ</sup> s10				Yes	M <sub>CTS10</sub>

Column 1S tabulates the sensors from the system block diagram.

Column 2S is computed by summing the failure rates of LRU's causing the sensor to indicate a fault. For instance:

$$F_4 = \lambda_1 + \lambda_{2-3} + \lambda_4 \tag{7}$$

Column 3S and 8S are obtained from FMEA and maintenance data.

Column 7S is from system analysis.

Column 4S, 5S, and 6S are based on analysis of the particular sensor hardware requirements and can vary from a weighted scale of 1 to 10 to detailed dollar and/or man-hour requirements.

Sensors are eliminated from Figure 8 based on the above criteria, and the various sensor sets are evaluated using failure data as follows:

## BIT Detectability Level (BDL)

$$BDL = \frac{\lambda - \lambda}{\lambda} u \tag{8}$$

BIT Isolation Level (BIL)

$$BIL = \frac{\lambda - \lambda_{u}^{-\lambda} NI}{\lambda - \lambda_{u}}, \qquad (9)$$

where

 $\lambda$  is the failure rate without BIT,

 $\lambda_{\bf u}$  is the failure rate of components undetected by BIT, and  $\lambda_{\rm N\,I}$  is the failure rate of components not isolated by BIT.

Comparison of the above computed levels with specifications determines whether the various sensor sets meet the requirements. For example, using sensors 1, 6 and 9 in Figure 8:

$$BDL = \frac{\sum_{i}^{\lambda} i^{-\lambda} 8}{\sum_{i}^{\lambda} i}$$
 (8)

$$BIL = \frac{\sum_{i} - (\lambda_{8}) = (\lambda_{2} + \lambda_{3} + \lambda_{4} + \lambda_{5} + \lambda_{6} + \lambda_{7})}{\sum_{i} - (\lambda_{8})}$$
(9)

## 8.3.4 Design Example

Based on the previous criteria and the assumptions:

 $\lambda_1$ < $\lambda_{2-2}$ , $\lambda_{2-3}$ , $\lambda_3$ , $\lambda_4$ ; sensor set 1, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 would be picked. Sensors 7 and 8 would be eliminated by redundancy considerations; leaving sensors 1, 6, 9 and 10.

The BIT Detectability Level (BDL) and the BIT Isolation Level (BIL) would be computed for these sensors as:

$$BDL = \frac{\lambda - \lambda_{\mathbf{u}}}{\lambda} = \frac{\Sigma \lambda_{\mathbf{i}} - 0}{\Sigma \lambda_{\mathbf{i}}} = 1.0$$
 (10)

$$BIL = \frac{\lambda - \lambda_{u} - \lambda_{NI}}{\lambda - \lambda_{u}} = \frac{\sum \lambda_{i} - 0 - (\lambda_{2} + \lambda_{3} + \lambda_{4} + \lambda_{5} + \lambda_{6} + \lambda_{7} + \lambda_{8})}{\lambda_{i}}, \quad (11)$$

where

 $\lambda$  is the failure rate without BIT = sum of all LRU  $\lambda$ 's,  $\lambda_u$  is the failure rate of components undetected by BIT; i.e., this is zero since sensor No. 10 faults on all failures, and  $\lambda_{\rm NI}$  is the failure rate of components not isolated by BIT; i.e., this is the same as  $\Sigma\lambda_{\rm i}$ - $\lambda_{\rm l}$  since LRU No. 1 is the only functional area isolated by the above sensor set.

It is obvious from the above that the BIL for this sensor set is very bad and another set of sensors should be selected.

The above procedure is followed until sensor sets are obtained satisfying the BDL and BIL specifications. An optimum set of sensors can then be selected based on the improvement in mean corrective maintenance time ( $M_{\rm CT}$ ) using the formula:

$$M_{CT} = \frac{\sum_{i}^{\lambda} i^{T} R_{i}^{-\sum_{i}^{\lambda} j^{T} S_{j}^{+\lambda} B^{T} RB}}{\sum_{i}^{\lambda} i^{+\lambda} B},$$
 (12)

where

 $\lambda_i$  = failure rate of the i<sup>th</sup> unit,

 ${}^{T}R_{i}$  = mean-time-to-repair the  $i^{th}$  unit without BIT,

 $\lambda_i$  = failure rate of the j<sup>th</sup> unit which contains BIT,

 $TS_j$  = time saved in repair of the j<sup>th</sup> unit by incorporating BIT,

 $\lambda_{R}$  = failure rate of BIT circuitry, and

 $T_{RB}$  = the time required to repair failed BIT circuitry.

 $T_S = T_{LI}$  -  $T_{LI} = Time saved by incorporating BIT,$ 

where

 $T_{LI}$ , = mean time required to perform fault location and isolation with no BIT, and

 $T_{LI}$  = mean time required to perform fault location and isolation aided by BIT.

	BIT Detected	No BIT
Location time	0	TL
Isolation time	FITI	$T_{I}$

where

 $T_L$  = location with no BIT,

FI = number of cards in fault-isolation set,

N = total number of cards, and

 $T_{I}$  = isolation time when  $\frac{FI}{N}$  = 1.

### REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1. NAVMATINST 3960.9, <u>Built-In-Test (BIT) Design Guide</u>, Naval Electronics Laboratory Center, 23 April 1979
- RADC-TR-78-224, <u>A Design Guide for Built-In-Test (BIT)</u>, Rome Air Development Center, Air Force Systems Command, April 1979
- 3. Acquisition Planning Guide for Automatic Testing Applications
- 4. Industry/Joint Services Automatic Test Conference and Workshop on Advanced Test Technology Management Acquisition Support, April 3-7, 1978
- Wilton P. Chase, <u>Management of System Engineering</u>, John Wiley and Sons, 1974

APPENDIX A
ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOKS

Han dbook No. 706 -	Document No. (Used by DDC and NTIS)	<u> Title</u>
100	AD-890 839	**Design Guidance for Producibility
101+	ADA-055 007	Army Weapon Systems Analysis, Part One
102+		*Army Weapon Systems Analysis, Part Two
103+		*Selected Topics in Experimental Statistics With Army Applications
104	AD-894 478	Value Engineering
106	AD-830 272	Elements of Armament Engineering, Part One, Sources of Energy
107	AD-830 287	Elements of Armament Engineering, Part Two, Ballistics
108	AD-830 288	Elements of Armament Engineering, Part Three, Weapon Systems and Components
109	AD-903 967	Tables of the Cumulative Binomial Probabilities
110	AD-865 421	Experimental Statistics, Section 1, Base Concepts and Analysis of Measurement Data
111	AD-865 422	Experimental Statistics, Section 2, Analysis of Enumerative and Classificatory Data
112	AD-865 423	Experimental Statistics, Section 3, Planning and Analysis of Comparative Experiments
113	AD-865 424	Experimental Statistics, Section 4, Special Topics
114	AD-865 425	Experimental Statistics, Section 5, Tables
115	AD-784 999	Environmental Series, Part One, Basic Environmental Concepts
116	ADA-012 648	Environmental Series, Part Two, Natural Environmental Factors

APPENDIX A

ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOKS (Cont'd)

Han dbook No. 706-	Document No. (Used by DDC and NTIS)	<u>Title</u>
117	ADA-023 512	Environmental Series, Part Three, Induced Environmental Factors
118	ADA-015 179	Environmental Series, Part Four, Life Cycle Environments
119	ADA-015 180	Environmental Series, Part Five, Glossary of Environmental Terms
120	AD-889 588	Criteria for Environmental Control of Mobile Systems
121	AD-901 533	Packaging and Pack Engineering
123	AD-884 519	Hydraulic Fluids
124	ADA-025 665	Reliable Military Electronics
125	AD-865 109	**Electrical Wire and Cable
127	AD-763 495	Infrared Military Systems, Part One
128(S)	ADC-001 857	Infrared Military Systems, Part Two (U)
130	AD-830 262	Design for Air Transport and Airdrop of Materiel
132	ADA-021 390	Maintenance Engineering Techniques (MET)
133	ADA-026 006	Maintainability Engineering Theory and Practice
134	AD-754 202	**Maintainability Guide for Design
136	AD-655 861	**Servomechanisms, Section 1, Theory
137	AD-830 263	**Servomechanisms, Section 2, Measurement and Signal Converters
138	AD-830 274	Servomechanisms, Section 3, Amplification
139	AD-830 283	Servomechanisms, Section 4, Power Elements and System Design

APPENDIX A
ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOKS (Cont'd)

Handbook No. 706 -	Document No. (Used by DDC and NTIS)	<u>Title</u>
140	AD-830 264	Trajectories, Differential Effects, and Data for Projectiles
150	AD-462 060	Interior Ballistics of Guns
158+		*Dynamics of Ballistic Impact, Part One
159(S) <sup>+</sup>		*Dynamics of Ballistic Impact, Part Two (U)
160	AD-389 219	Elements of Terminal Ballistics, Part One, Kill Mechanisms and Vulnerability
161	AD-289 318	Elements of Terminal Ballistics, Part Two, Collection and Analysis of Data Concerning Targets
162(SRD)	AD-389 372	Elements of Terminal Ballistics, Part Three, Application to Missile and Space Targets (以)
163(C) <sup>+</sup>	ADC-013 060	Basic Target Vulnerability (U)
165	AD-853 719	Liquid-Filled Projectile Design
170(S)	AD-530 922	Armor and Its Applications (U)
175	AD-830 265	Solid Propellants, Part One
177	AD-764 340	**Properties of Explosives of Military Interest
179	AD-777 482	Explosive Trains
180	AD-900 260	Principles of Explosive Behavior
181	ADA-003 817	Explosions in Air, Part One
182(SRD)	ADC-004 269	Explosions in Air, Part Two (U)
185	AD-817 071	Military Pyrotechnics, Part One, Theory and Applications
186	AD-830 371	Military Pyrotechnics, Part Three, Procedures and Glossary

APPENDIX A

ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOKS (Cont'd)

Handbook No. 706-	Document No. (Used by DDC and NTIS)	<u>Title</u>
187	AD-830 394	Military Pyrotechnics, Part Three, Properties of Materials Used in Pyrotechnic Compositions
188	ADA-000 821	Military Pyrotechnics, Part Four, Design of Ammunition for Pyrotechnic Effects
189	AD-803 864	Military Pyrotechnics, Part Five, Bibliography
191	AD-884 151	System Analysis and Cost Effectiveness
192	AD-767 826	Computer-Aided Design of Mechanical Systems
193 <sup>†</sup>	ADA-055 008	Computer-Aided Design of Mechanical Systems, Part Two
196	ADA-027 370	Development Guide for Reliability, Part Two, Design for Reliability
197	ADA-032 105	Development Guide for Reliability, Part Three, Reliability Prediction
198	ADA-027 371	Development Guide for Reliability, Part Four, Reliability Measurement
199	**	*Development Guide for Reliability, Part Five, Contracting for Reliability
200	ADA-027 372	Development Guide for Reliability, Part Six, Mathematical Appendix and Glossary
201	ADA-002 007	Helicopter Engineering, Part One, Preliminary Design
202	ADA-033 216	Helicopter Engineering, Part Two, Detail Design
203	AD-901 657	**Helicopter Engineering, Part Three, Qualification Assurance
204	AD-785 000	Helicopter Performance Testing

APPENDIX A

ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOKS (Cont'd)

Handbook No. 706 -	Document No. (Used by DDC and NTIS)	<u> Title</u>
205	ADA-020 020	Timing Systems and Components
210	AD-889 245	**Fuzes
211	AD-389 295	Fuzes, Proximity, Electrical, Part One
212(S)	AD-389 331	Fuzes, Proximity, Electrical, Part Two (U)
213(S)	AD-389 330	Fuzes, Proximity, Electrical, Part Three (U)
214(S)	AD-389 333	Fuzes, Proximity, Electrical, Part Four (U)
215	AD-389 296	Fuzes, Proximity, Electrical, Part Five
235	AD-894 910	Hardening Weapon Systems Against RF Energy
238	ADA-023 513	Recoilless Rifle Weapon Systems
240(C)	AD-386 896	Grenades (U)
242	AD-801 509	Design for Control of Projectile Flight Characteristics
244	AD-830 290	Ammunition, Section 1, Artillery Ammunition - General, with Table of Contents, Glossary, and Index for Series
245	AD- 389 304	Ammunition, Section 2, Design for Terminal Effects
247	AD-830 296	Ammunition, Section 4, Design for Projection
248	AD-830 284	Ammunition, Section 5, Inspection Aspects of Artillery Ammunition Design
249	AD-830 266	Ammunition, Section 6, Manufacture of Metallic Components of Artillery Ammunition
250	AD-830 303	Guns - General
251	AD-838 748	Muzzle Devices
252	AD-830 297	**Gun Tubes

APPENDIX A

ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOKS (Cont'd)

Handbook No. 706 -	Document No. (Used by DDC and NTIS)	<u> Title</u>
253 <sup>†</sup>		*Breech Mechanism Design
255	AD-818 532	Spectral Characteristics of Muzzle Flash
260	AD-868 578	Automatic Weapons
261 <sup>+</sup>		*Mortar Weapon Systems
270	ADA-016 716	Propellant Actuated Devices
280	AD-840 582	<pre>**Design of Aerodynamically Stabilized Free Rockets</pre>
281 (SRD)	AD-389 352	Weapon System Effectiveness (U)
283	AD-830 377	Aerodynamics
284	AD-389 298	Trajectories
285	AD-861 082	Elements of Aircraft and Missile Propulsion
286	AD-830 267	Structures
290	AD-501 329	Warheads - General
2 <b>98</b> †		*Rocket and Missile Container Engineering Guide
300	AD-905 372	***Fabric Design (Limited Document)
312	ADA-013 178	Rotational Molding of Plastic Powders
313	ADA-015 181	Short Fiber Plastic Base Composites
314 <sup>+</sup>		*Discontinuous Glass Fiber Reinforced Plastics
315 <sup>+</sup>		*Dielectric Embedding of Electrical or Electronic Components
316 <sup>+</sup>		*Joining of Advanced Composites
317 <sup>+</sup>		*Fabrication of Continuous Fiber Reinforced Plastics

APPENDIX A

ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOKS (Cont'd)

Handbook No. 706 -	Document No. (Used by DDC and NTIS)	Title
318 <sup>+</sup>		*Materials Engineering for Plastic Product
		Design
319 <sup>†</sup>		*Designing for NDT Inspection Techniques for Structural Composites
327	AD-830 809	Fire Control Systems - General
329	AD-879 465	Fire Control Computing Systems
331	AD-830 275	Compensating Elements
340	AD-830 276	Carriages and Mounts - General
341	AD-830 277	Cradles
342	AD-830 281	**Recoil Systems
343	AD-830 393	Top Carriages
344	AD-830 396	Bottom Carriages
345	ADA-003 347	Equilibrators
346	AD-830 301	Elevating Mechanisms
347	AD-830 291	Traversing Mechanisms
348 <sup>+</sup>		Design of Towed Artillery Weapon Systems
350	AD-881 357	Wheeled Amphibians
355	AD-830 268	The Automotive Assembly
356	AD-817 023	Automotive Suspensions
357	AD-873 103	Automotive Bodies and Hulls
358 <sup>†</sup>	ADA-035 445	Analysis and Design of Automotive Brake Systems
360	AD-783 697	Military Vehicle Electrical Systems

APPENDIX A

ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOKS (Cont'd)

Handbook No. 706-	Document No. (Used by DDC and NTIS)	<u>Title</u>
361	ADA-013 769	Military Vehicle Power Plant Cooling
410+	ADA-038 803	Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
411(S)	ADC-008 827	Vulnerability of Communication-Electronic and Electro-Optical Systems (Except Guided Missiles) to Electronic Warfare, Part One, Introduction and General Approach to Electronic Warfare Vulnerability (U)
412(C)	ADC-008 828	Part Two, Electronic Warfare Vulnerability of Tactical Communications (U)
413(S)	ADC-008 829	Part Three, Electronic Warfare Vulnerability of Ground Based and Airborne Surveillance and Target Acquisition Radars (U)
414(S)	ADC-008 830	Part Four, Electronic Warfare Vulnerability of Avionics (U)
415(S)	ADC-008 831	Part Five, Optical/Electronic Warfare Vulnerability of Electro-Optic Systems (U)
416(S)	ADC-008 832	Part Six, Electronic Warfare Vulnerability of Satellite Communications (U)
417(S) <sup>+</sup>		Vulnerability of Guided Missile Systems to Electronic Warfare (U)
445	AD-903 789	Sabot Technology Engineering
470 <sup>†</sup>	ADA-029 902	Metric Conversion Guide
475 <sup>+</sup>		*Quality Engineering
480		*Safety Engineering Design Guide for Army Materiel

\*UNDER PREPARATION - NOT AVAILABLE
\*\*REVISION UNDER PREPARATION

\*\*\*LIMITED DOCUMENTS ARE NOT FOR SALE BY NTIS +DARCOM-P 706-

#### APPENDIX A

## ENGINEERING DESIGN HANDBOOKS (Cont'd)

These Handbooks are available to Department of the Army activities by submitting an official requisition form (DA Form 17, 17 Jan 70) directly to the Commander, Letterkenny Army Depot, ATTN: SDSLE-AJD, Chambersburg, PA 17201. "Need to Know" justification must accompany request for classified Handbooks. Requestors - DOD, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, non-military Government agencies, contractors, private industry, individuals, universities, and others - who are registered with the Defense Documentation Center (DDC) and have a National Technical Information Service (NTIS) deposit account may obtain these Handbooks from the DDC. To obtain classified documents from the DDC, "Need to Know" must be established by the submission of DD Form 1540, 1 Jul 71. Requestors, not part of the Department of the Army nor registered with the DDC, may purchase unclassified Handbooks from the National Technical Information Service, Department of Commerce, Springfield, VA 22161. All Handbooks carry the prefix AMCP 706-unless otherwise indicated.

# DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. of Copies
DRSMI-R, Dr. McCorkle	1
DRSMI-RPR	3
DRSMI-RPT (Record Copy)	1
(Reference Copy)	1
DRSMI-LP, Mr. Voigt	1
Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, VA 22314	12
IIT Research Institute ATTN: GACIAC 10 West 35th Street Chicago, IL 60616	1
U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity ATTN: DRXSY-MP Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005	ì
DRSMI-RLD	20
DRSMI-XA	1
DRSMI-RGG	1
DRSMI-CF	1
DRSMI-HD	1
DRSMI-PE	1
DRSMI-DT	1
DRSMI-RS	1
DRSMI-ROL	1
DRSMI-VI	1
DRSMI-HA	1
DRSMI-LC	1
DRSMI-MP	1
Sperry Systems Management 1112 Church Street Huntsville, AL 35801 ATTN: R. L. Heifner	4

